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EDITORIAL 
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The economic recovery in the euro area is 
gathering momentum, albeit at a modest pace. 
GDP growth turned positive in the third quarter. 
Latest economic confidence indicators are 
broadly in line with our growth forecast, which 
projects GDP growth to reach 0.7 % in 2010 as a 
whole and to accelerate to 1.5 % of GDP in 
2011. However, let’s not forget that the current 
recovery is underpinned by massive economic 
support provided by governments around the 
world, which will eventually have to be scaled 
back. Moreover, high and still rising 
unemployment, one of the topics addressed in 
this issue of Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, 
reminds us of the important policy agenda ahead 
of us.  
2010 will be a challenging and decisive year for 
euro-area policy makers and the euro-area 
economy. Looking back on 2009, solid 
groundwork has been put in place to go ahead: 
first, the European Economic Recovery Plan 
(EERP), launched in December 2008, helped 
cushion the collapse of economic activity. 
Without the EERP, the contraction of euro-area 
GDP would have been deeper this year. 
Designed for a two-year period, it will continue 
to provide valuable support next year.  
Second, recognising that our economies cannot 
rely on life support forever, the Ecofin Council 
in October articulated clear and transparent 
principles for the eventual exit from the 
formidable government and central bank 
interventions. Provided that economic 
circumstances do not unexpectedly deteriorate 
again, fiscal consolidation will start in 2011 at 
the latest and will include a consolidation effort 
of well beyond 0.5 % of GDP per year. 
Depending on national features, some Member 
States will have to start consolidation earlier. It 
will have to be supplemented by structural 
reforms underpinning the long-term 
sustainability of public finances and minimising 
the negative impact of the crisis on potential 
growth. The pace of fiscal adjustment and the 
deadlines for correction of the excessive deficits 
have to be differentiated according to country-
specific circumstances. In line with these 
principles, the Ecofin Council in December 
adopted ambitious but realistic recommendations 
to correct Member States' excessive deficits. 
Third, Finance Ministers, the Commission and 
the ECB have agreed principles for the gradual 
winding down of the financial sector support 
schemes, too. On the basis of Commission 
proposals and in line with European state aid 
rules, the phasing out will be gradual, taking into 
account the economic and financial stability 
conditions in Member States, and should start 
with the potentially most distorting government 
guarantees.  
Finally, Europe is reworking its financial market 
supervisory architecture. Following 
recommendations by the de Larosière Group and 
detailed legislative proposals by the Commission 
earlier this year, the European Council in 
December agreed to a new supervisory 
framework for the European Union. To better 
bolster the stability of European financial 
markets in future, a new European Systemic 
Risk Board will monitor macro-prudential risks 
and issue warnings and recommendations for 
policy action if risks are judged significant. In 
addition, three European supervisory authorities 
for banks, insurance and securities markets will 
be created with a view to unifying supervisory 
practices across Member States and to be able to 
act efficiently in a financial emergency. The 
European Parliament will start debating the 
reform package early next year with a view to 
establishing the new system in the course of 
2010.  
Looking ahead to 2010, uncertainty remains 
high, and setbacks in the recovery cannot be 
ruled out. In such an environment, to minimise 
potentially negative confidence effects, the 
conduct of credible, time-consistent and 
predictable economic policies is essential.  
For fiscal policy this means the need for full 
compliance with the recommendations for the 
correction of excessive deficits as agreed by the 
Council following proposals by the Commission. 
The overall fiscal stance for the euro area will 
remain appropriately expansive in 2010. But in 
some Member States, where the rise in public 
debt and the vulnerabilities of the economy are 
particularly high, the immediate implementation 
of consolidation is a matter of urgency. Ensuring 
fiscal sustainability is essential for a self-
sustained and durable recovery of the euro-area 
economy. This is one of the aspects highlighted 
in the Focus section on fiscal sustainability. 
As recently demonstrated by strong market 
reactions, fiscal sustainability needs to be 
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restored as soon as possible. The experience of 
Greece is a source of serious concern. In light of 
the ballooning public finance deficit, the 
Commission will come forward early next year 
with recommendations on how to correct the 
excessive deficit.  
The year 2010 will be particularly crucial for 
making progress on financial sector repair as the 
banking sector continues to be under stress. How 
fragile and nervous markets still are was 
demonstrated last month when Dubai World’s 
announcement that it was delaying debt service 
sent a shiver through global markets. It should 
be clear, however, that government support 
schemes should be kept in place only as long as 
necessary since they would eventually distort the 
industry, impede the integration of our financial 
market and hamper growth. We need to ensure 
that the banking sector ultimately becomes 
sufficiently capitalised to withstand future 
adverse shocks. It is important that the 
capitalisation process does not impair the 
provision of credit to the real economy.  
The crisis has had a profound impact on the 
banking industry, as discussed in our Focus 
section. One the one hand it has fostered 
consolidation in the banking sector, while on the 
other hand it has led to increasing fragmentation 
along national borders. Moreover, the crisis is 
putting pressure on the banking sector to 
restructure, partly because banks face new 
market conditions, but also due to regulatory 
reform and EU state aid rules. The new (cross-
border) supervision is also shaping the future 
trend of banking in the euro area.  
Looking ahead at the challenges for growth and 
employment next year and beyond, it is essential 
for the euro area to re-energise its structural 
reform agenda. The challenge now is to make 
progress on a comprehensive growth agenda, 
which addresses the manifold labour market 
challenges, facilitates the reallocation of 
resources to new activities, enhances the euro 
area’s adjustment capacity and boosts the long-
run growth potential of the euro-area economy. 
With a view to forging a framework for strong, 
balanced and sustainable growth in Europe over 
the next decade, the new Commission at the 
beginning of 2010 will propose a new and 
comprehensive EU 2020 strategy. The timing for 
this looks right, not only in terms of the 
formidable adjustment needs, but also in terms 
of public attitudes towards structural reform in 
the euro area. This Quarterly Report on the Euro 
Area argues that there is a window of 
opportunity that governments must embrace pro-
actively to boost growth and jobs.   
2010 will be a decisive year for the world 
economy as a whole. Economic policy 
coordination by the G20 proved instrumental in 
averting global economic meltdown at a critical 
juncture. Nourishing the recovery and delivering 
strong and balanced growth for the world 
economy over the medium term is now one of 
the key challenges for the G20 going forward 
and will be at the top of the agenda at the G20 
summit in Canada in June 2010. All major 
economies will have to do their part to make it a 
success, but action has to be differentiated 
depending on the specific situation and outlook 
for the economies. 
The euro area is committed to playing a 
constructive role at the global level by boosting 
structural reform and putting in place an orderly 
and time-consistent exit strategy. In the US, 
continued support seems warranted in 2010 to 
spur the recovery and smooth the ongoing 
deleveraging of private households and 
corporations. At the same time, in order to 
counter potentially destabilising sustainability 
concerns, it becomes increasingly important to 
define and articulate a credible strategy for the 
eventual withdrawal of the extraordinary fiscal 
and monetary stimulus measures. As economic 
growth is gathering momentum in Asia, stimulus 
policies should be scaled back progressively to 
avoid overheating. China needs to make further 
progress to increase domestic consumption, 
building on recent efforts and underpinned by a 
gradual appreciation of the renmimbi. As argued 
in this Report, further progress on exchange rate 
adjustment would be in the interest of the 
Chinese economy as much as of the world 
economy as a whole.  
Let me wish readers of the Quarterly Report on 
the Euro Area a calm and relaxing break and a 
prosperous and successful New Year. 
 
MARCO BUTI 
DIRECTOR-GENERAL 
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The worst recession in the euro area’s short history seems to have come to an end in the third quarter of 2009. 
The rebound in activity reflects improvements in the external environment, the unprecedented fiscal and 
monetary policy actions that were taken worldwide and the improvements in financial conditions. Many 
financial indicators are now at pre-crisis levels. However, money and credit growth to enterprises and 
households remains subdued on the back of low asset prices and weak demand. Moreover, while the recent 
stabilisation in financial markets appears to be fairly robust, the improvement in financial indicators has been 
rather gradual recently and financial conditions are still vulnerable. Euro-area GDP growth turned positive in 
the third quarter, after five consecutive negative quarters. Benefiting from the improvement in the global 
economy, euro-area exports were the key driver of the rebound in growth in the third quarter. Inventories also 
contributed positively to GDP growth, reflecting a slower pace of inventory drawdown. In contrast, household 
consumption contracted slightly during the third quarter, in particular as a result of the deterioration of the 
labour market. Investment continued to contract, although at a much slower pace. The Commission’s Autumn 
forecasts project 0.2 % q-o-q growth for the last quarter of 2009. For 2009 as a whole, GDP is still set to fall by 
some 4 %. 
The outlook for the euro-area economy as it emerges from recession is still uncertain. One major concern is the 
deterioration of labour markets. In 2009, the euro-area labour market recorded a pronounced slowdown with 
significant job losses occurring across many Member States and sectors. However, compared to the size of the 
output losses, the increase in unemployment in the euro area as a whole has been small, with the bulk of the 
remaining adjustment consisting of reductions in hours worked per person. Flexible working time arrangements, 
short-time working schemes and temporary closures have prevented more significant labour shedding so far. 
Against the background of a modest recovery in 2010, the unemployment rate is set to reach 10 ¾ % in 2010 and 
to rise further to almost 11% in 2011. As regards wages, growth in compensation per employee slowed down 
considerably during the first half of 2009. A VAR analysis shows that this response of wages during the current 
crisis has been particularly exceptional compared to past experience, when nominal wages hardly changed in 
response to an unexpected GDP shock. Conversely, the analysis shows that negotiated wages do not respond 
directly to the business cycle but do respond with a lag to a shock to compensations per employee. 
Uncertainty about the consequences of the financial and economic crisis has resulted in highly volatile currency 
markets over the last quarters. The relative level of money market rates appears to have been a driving force of 
exchange rates during the financial crisis. In the acute phase of the crisis, the euro is found to have appreciated 
more against high-yielding than against low-yielding currencies, reflecting a retrenchment in risk sentiment and 
pointing to an important role for the unwinding of carry trade flows. The general increase in risk awareness also 
affected countries with low foreign exchange reserves, high current account deficits and low net external assets 
that saw their currencies depreciating against the euro. Since March 2009, these trends have been partly 
reversed. Interestingly, a more traditional determinant of exchange rate movements like inflation differentials, 
though important in the pre-crisis period, seems to have hardly played a role throughout the crisis. 
Structural reforms play a critical role in the design of exit strategies in the euro area as the economy needs to 
cushion the negative impact of the recession on output potential and as stronger growth helps fiscal 
consolidation. Successful policy action will, however, depend on public support for reforms. According to the 
Eurobarometer survey, the current crisis has increased the perceived need for structural reform in most euro-
area countries. Member States that have been hit more severely by the crisis have experienced the largest 
increases in the perceived need for reforms. In terms of policy implications, these results should, however, be 
considered with caution as the survey results also point to a persistent reluctance to accept the possible short-
term costs of some reforms.  
The report also presents some simulations with a new ECFIN model that better reflects the fact that growth in 
the euro area is knowledge-based. The simulations make it possible to assess the macroeconomic impact of a set 
of structural reforms aimed at stimulating research and innovation, competition and human capital. Results 
show that these policy measures all have sizeable positive effects on GDP and employment. However, the effects 
of the measures vary widely across countries. This highlights the importance of taking Member States’ initial 
conditions into account when devising structural reforms. Countries where knowledge investment and 
competition are currently low would benefit the most from the adoption of structural reforms. 
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1. Recent economic and financial 
developments (1) 
Financial conditions have considerably improved 
since March 2009 thanks to financial sector 
support programmes, macroeconomic stimulus 
and the economic recovery. Government 
interventions have reduced the downside risks and 
contributed to higher risk appetite. Banks have 
also benefited from a very steep yield curve. 
However, money and credit growth to enterprises 
and households remains subdued on the back of 
low asset prices and weak demand. Moreover, 
while the recent stabilisation in financial markets 
appears to be fairly robust, the improvement in 
financial indicators has been rather gradual 
recently and financial conditions are still 
vulnerable and far from normal. 
Money and bond markets 
Conditions in euro-area money markets have 
continued to stabilise in recent months. The euro-
area 3-month (unsecured) money market rate 
declined slightly to 0.72 % in early December 
2009 from around 0.75 % at the beginning of 
October. In October 2008, it peaked at 5.39 %. 
The low interest rate reflects easing global 
economic and financial risk perceptions as well as 
low policy rates and large liquidity injections by 
the ECB. However, the very low money market 
rates (currently below the ECB’s 1 % interest rate 
on the main refinancing operations) also indicate 
that large amounts of the central bank liquidity 
remain in the interbank market instead of feeding 
through to the broader economy. Interbank 
spreads, measured as the difference between 
unsecured money market rates and risk-free 
interest rates with similar maturity, have also 
decreased moderately during the last three months 
to levels around 30 basis points at the beginning 
of December 2009, which compares to nearly 200 
basis points in mid-October 2008. 
German 10-year government bond yields have 
remained low during the last three months, and 
they still appear to incorporate some doubts over 
the strength and extent of the economic recovery. 
Furthermore, an intense debate among market 
participants over the monetary policy exit strategy 
caused some fluctuations in bond yields. Finally, 
sustained buying of government bonds by the 
                                                        
(1) The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue was 
16 December. 
banking sector and institutional investors may 
have supported bond prices and pushed down 
yields, despite strong issuance. The 10-year Bund 
yield stood at 3.20 % in mid December 2009, 
compared to 3.19 % on 1 October 2009. 
Graph I.1.1: Euro-area money market  
(in %, spread in pp, 1 Jan 2007 to 16 Dec 2009) 
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Yield spreads on euro-denominated sovereign 
bonds relative to the German Bund have stabilised 
for some countries but widened for others, above 
all in Greece, following sovereign debt 
downgrades and a large upward revision to the 
Greek public deficit in early November. 
Government bond prices were also affected 
upwards in Ireland, Spain and Italy. The renewed 
global risk aversion due to the debt standstill of 
Dubai World caused some further widening in 
some euro-area yield spreads. The euro-area 
sovereign bond spreads are highest in Greece (231 
bps), Ireland (153 bps) and Italy (80 bps).  
Graph I.1.2: Sovereign bond spreads, euro area 
(in bps, 1 Jan 2007 to 16 Dec 2009) 
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The cost of finance continues to decline 
Overall external financing costs declined further 
in recent months, as retail lending rates followed 
earlier declines in market interest rates. 
Furthermore, more risky corporate bond yield 
spreads over the German Bund narrowed, with 
spreads on BBB corporates down by around 25 
bps during the last three months, to 145 bps. 
Spreads on the less risky AAA corporates, 
however, increased slightly by 10 bps to about 60 
bps. More generally, the decline in general risk 
aversion has reduced corporate bond spreads 
across risk classes since March 2009. Also, the 
the ECB covered bond purchase programme 
initiated in July 2009 adding further to the 
narrowing of corporate bond spreads by 
stimulating demand for corporate bonds. 
Graph I.1.3: Stock prices and implied volatility 
of stock prices  
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Although euro-area stock prices have been 
moving sideways in the most recent couple of 
months, prices have generally risen sharply since 
the bottom in March 2009 amidst evidence of an 
imminent inflexion point in the business cycle and 
improved earnings results. By mid December 
2009, the Eurostoxx50 was 60 % above its March 
2009 trough. Nonetheless, volatility in equity 
markets remains elevated and a large degree of 
uncertainty persists, most recently exemplified by 
the debt standstill in Dubai World. 
The European Commission’s Composite Nominal 
Financing Cost Indicators (CFCI) for non-
financial euro-area corporations and households 
continued to decline in October 2009 and is 2.0 
percentage points and 1.1 percentage points, 
respectively, lower than at their peak in October 
2008. For non-financial corporations, the cost of 
shares and market debt declined, while the 
average cost of bank loans was stable amid 
broadly unchanged market interest rates in 
October. For households, the development in 
costs across maturities and types of bank loans 
was mixed in October. Particularly the cost of 
loans for house purchases and the cost of short-
term consumer credit fell, reflecting earlier 
declines in market interest rates. 
Graph I.1.4: Composite financial indicator, euro 
area (in %, Mar 2003 to Oct 2009) 
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Zero credit growth 
Growth rates in broad money and credit fell to 
around zero percent in October 2009, thus 
continuing the growth decline on account of the 
weak economic activity and the steepening of the 
euro-area yield curve. The steepness of the yield 
curve, reflecting the low ECB key interest rates, 
increased incentives to shift out of monetary 
assets. The low money growth could also indicate 
the start of an unwinding of the monetary 
imbalances accumulated in the past years. The 
downward movement in the M3 growth rate, 
which began in October 2007, accelerated in 
October 2009 as M3 grew only 0.3 percent y-o-y. 
This compares to 1.8 percent y-o-y in September 
2009. 
M1 growth, on the contrary, has been high in 
2009, partly reflecting the continued fall in money 
market interest rates, which has brought the 
opportunity cost of holding liquid monetary assets 
to particularly low levels, as opposed to longer-
term instruments included in M3. M1 growth 
decreased to 11.8 percent y-o-y in October, down 
from 12.8 percent in September. 
The annual growth rate of loans to non-financial 
corporations dropped to -0.8 percent in October, 
down from -0.1 percent in the previous month, 
along the downward trend that started in March 
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2008. The slowdown in loans growth for 
corporations stems probably more from lower 
demand for credit due to the economic downturn 
and economic uncertainty than from supply 
constraints. Moreover, the downward path reflects 
the still ongoing de-leveraging process. The 
annual growth rate of loans to households has 
hovered around zero percent in recent months (-
0.1 percent in October). The weakness of 
economic activity and house prices, as well as 
uncertainty concerning the medium-term outlook 
for global economic activity and employment, are 
likely to have been the main factors dampening 
loan growth for households. However, going 
forward, lending to households may improve, as 
banks’ preference to lend typically shifts towards 
households at the trough of the economic cycle, as 
these loans are better collateralised – reducing the 
perceived credit risk and the capital charge. 
Graph I.1.5: Monetary aggregates  
(in %, y-o-y, Jan 1999 to Oct 2009) 
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According to the ECB October 2009 Bank 
Lending Survey released in late October, there are 
still more banks reporting a tightening of credit 
standards applied to loans and credit lines to 
enterprises than those reporting an easing. 
Nonetheless, the net percentage of banks reporting 
a tightening of credit standards declined 
considerably.  
Exchange rate developments 
Foreign exchange markets have been 
characterised by a strong correlation between risk 
sentiment and currencies over the last quarters. In 
general, currencies which depreciated following 
the initial stage of the crisis have appreciated 
since March 2009, as the crisis triggered a flight 
into the safe haven of the dollar and an unwinding 
of yen-funded carry trade. (2) The reversal of 
capital flows to higher-yielding currencies has 
largely reversed the earlier weakness in major 
emerging market and commodity currencies.  
Graph I.1.6: Euro, dollar and yen exchange rates 
(2 Jan 2006 to 16 Dec 2009) 
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Largely in line with the shifts in risk sentiment, 
volatility on forex markets has decreased sharply 
in recent months. Since its peak at the end of 
2008, volatility, as measured by implied volatility 
of currency options, has fallen significantly. 
However, it is still at an elevated level compared 
to the pre-crisis period. Moreover, most recently, 
there has been a slight increase in volatility.  
Graph I.1.7: Exchange rate volatility  
(1 Jun 2006 to 16 Dec 2009) 
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The euro CPI-deflated real effective exchange rate 
(REER) appreciated in the last quarter and it is 
currently 6.5 percent stronger than a year ago and 
2 percent stronger than its average 2008 level. 
 
                                                        
(2) For a more detailed analysis on exchange rate developments, 
see ‘The euro during the financial crisis’ in this issue. 
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Estimates of the euro equilibrium exchange rate 
point to a strong euro with an estimated 
overvaluation of the REER of around 7 to 8 
percent. Further euro appreciation could be a 
serious concern for the more open euro-area 
economies.  
Developments in the effective euro exchange rates 
mask different evolutions in bilateral exchange 
rates. The euro  appreciated further against the US 
dollar until late November, reaching 1.51 on 25 
November, but has depreciated since then to 1.45 
in mid December on account of an improved 
economic outlook for the US and some concerns 
related to the situation in Greece. The Chinese 
renminbi followed a similar pattern against the 
euro, as the renminbi was de facto pegged to the 
dollar during the review period. By contrast, over 
the last couple of months the euro fluctuated 
around a horizontal line against the Japanese yen 
as well as the UK pound, depreciated against the 
Swiss Franc, and appreciated vis-à-vis the 
Swedish krona and some Central and Eastern 
European currencies (CZ, PL, HU). 
Recession is over and recovery can set in 
The deepest, longest and most broad-based 
recession in the euro area’s history seems to be 
over. Euro-area GDP growth turned positive in 
the third quarter, after five consecutive negative 
quarters. The euro-area economy expanded by 
0.4 % quarter-on-quarter, marking the end of the 
recession. Most countries experienced a marked 
rebound in GDP growth, with only Cyprus (-
1.4 %), Greece (-0.3 %) and Spain (-0.3 %) still 
contracting (at the cut-off date).  
While the figures for the third quarter broadly 
confirm the recovery, it should be borne in mind 
that this rebound in economic activity reflects 
improvements in the external environment and 
financial conditions, as well as the unprecedented 
fiscal and monetary policy actions that have been 
taken.    
An export-led recovery helped by 
unprecedented policy support 
On the back of unprecedented policy support 
worldwide and the positive developments in 
financial markets just discussed, the economic 
situation of the world economy has substantially 
improved. Some economies, namely in Asia, 
already started to rebound in the first half of 2009.  
Benefiting from the improvement in the global  
economy, euro-area exports were the key driver of 
the rebound in growth in the third quarter. Exports 
are typically the first component to recover when 
the euro-area business cycle turns around. In this 
context, recent developments in trade indicators 
are very promising. Euro-area export growth 
increased significantly in the third quarter (2.9 % 
q-o-q) compared to the second quarter (-1.3 %). 
At the same time, imports rebounded as well 
(2.6 %). The net contribution from trade was 
therefore slightly positive.  
This sign of improvement is backed up by 
encouraging developments in world trade. 
According to estimates by the Netherlands Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, average world trade in the 
third quarter was up by 4.3 % compared to the 
second quarter. After the dramatic fall in global 
trade in 2008, this was the first positive quarterly 
growth since 2008Q. 
Graph I.1.8: World trade and PMI  
(Jan 1998 to November 2009) (1) 
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Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy 
Analysis and Bloomberg. 
Looking ahead, recent survey indicators of the 
world economy all seem to suggest a global 
recovery. The November reading of the Ifo 
quarterly World Economic Climate Indicator rose 
for the third consecutive time. The rise in this 
indicator was the result of both more favourable 
expectations for the coming six months and a 
more positive assessment of the current situation. 
The economic climate improved in all major 
economic regions, and was particularly marked in 
Asia. Developments in the global PMI for 
manufacturing give a similar picture. In 
November, the index remained above the neutral 
50.0 points for the fifth consecutive month. 
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Investment still subdued but inventories back 
to more normal levels 
The second GDP component to pick up in a usual 
euro-area recovery phase is investment. This was 
however not yet the case during the third quarter. 
Euro-area gross fixed capital formation declined 
by 0.4 % q-o-q. Nevertheless, this represented a 
continuous improvement compared to the past 
few quarters (-4.9 % in 2009Q1 and -1.7 % in 
2009Q2). 
Some euro-area countries even experienced 
positive investment growth. This was the case of 
Germany, for instance, where growth during the 
third quarter was strongly supported by capital 
formation (1.3 % q-o-q). The decline in 
investment in the euro area was the result of the 
acceleration of the contraction of construction 
investment. Both housing and non-housing 
investment declined, by -2% and -0.8% q-o-q 
respectively. In contrast, non-construction 
investment (essentially machinery and transport 
equipment) increased for the first time since 
2008Q2, by 1.1% q-o-q in the third quarter.  
The October 2009 reading of the Commission’s 
quarterly manufacturing surveys shows that firms 
have started to use their capacity at a slightly 
higher rate. But utilisation rates are still far below 
their long-term average, and the sizeable spare 
capacity will probably slow investment growth in 
the medium term.  
Inventories need to come down to normal levels 
before the recovery of exports will lead to a pick-
up in investment. Signals are positive on this. In 
line with expectations, changes in inventories 
contributed positively to GDP growth (0.3 %) 
during the third quarter. This reflects a slower 
pace of inventory drawdown, signalling that the 
bulk of stock adjustment has already taken place. 
Looking forward, inventories are expected to 
make a further positive contribution to growth in 
the last quarter of 2009. This is in line with the 
latest Commission survey indicators, which 
suggest that the level of inventories is increasingly 
considered normal by firms.  
Labour market conditions weighing on 
consumption 
While household consumption had held up 
relatively well during the second quarter, notably 
thanks to sizeable stimulus measures, it contracted 
slightly during the third quarter (-0.2 % q-o-q). 
The deterioration of the labour market seems to 
start outweighing the positive effect of the 
stimulus measures. 
Employment in the euro area continued to 
contract by 0.5% q-o-q in the third quarter, after 
an equivalent drop in the second quarter. At the 
same time, unemployment increased to 9.6 % in 
the third quarter, compared to 9.3 % in the second 
quarter. In October, it stood at 9.8 %, stable 
compared to September. Compared to the size of 
the output loss, the overall increase in 
unemployment in the euro area has been muted so 
far (notwithstanding country differences), with the 
bulk of the adjustment consisting of reductions in 
hours worked per person. (3) Data for the second 
quarter of 2009 show that the average hours 
worked per week declined by 0.8 % y-o-y in the 
euro area. In Germany, the decline reached 1.3 % 
                                                        
(3) For a more detailed analysis on labour markets, see ‘The 
impact of the crisis on the labour market’ in this issue. 
 
Table I.1.1: Euro-area growth components 
2009 2010
GDP -0.4 -1.9 -2.4 -0.2 0.4  -4.0  -4.0 0.7
Private consumption 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 -0.2  -1.0  -1.0 0.2
Government consumption 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5  2.3  2.0 1.1
Gross fixed capital formation -1.4 -3.8 -4.9 -1.7 -0.4  -9.9  -10.7 -1.9
Exports of goods and services -1.3 -7.2 -8.7 -1.3 2.9  -14.0  -14.2 2.1
Imports of goods and services -0.1 -4.8 -7.4 -2.9 2.6  -11.8  -12.5 1.1
Private consumption 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.1  -0.6  -0.6 0.1
Government consumption 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.5  0.4 0.2
Gross fixed capital formation -0.3 -0.8 -1.0 -0.3 -0.1  -2.2  -2.3 -0.4
Changes in inventories 0.4 0.3 -0.7 -0.6 0.3  -0.6  -0.7 0.3
Net exports -0.6 -1.2 -0.6 0.7 0.2  -1.2  -0.8 0.4
change on prev. yearPercentage  change on previous period, volumes
contribution
Autumn 2009 forecast
2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2 2009 Q3
Percentage point contribution to change in GDP
Carryover 
to 2009
Source: Commission services. 
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y-o-y. Moreover, part-time in percentage of total 
employment increased by 0.4 % y-o-y during the 
same period in the euro area.  
Developments in the savings rate are also 
restraining household consumption. Uncertainty 
about the economic outlook and rising 
unemployment coupled with the need for 
deleveraging of households’ balance sheets have 
led to an increase in the euro-area savings ratio of 
2.6 percentage points since 2008Q1. In 2009Q2, 
this ratio stood at 16.5 %.  
Looking ahead, prospects for household 
consumption are mixed. On the negative side, 
employment developments will continue 
weighing negatively on consumption. Moreover, 
the disinflation process, which has come to an 
end, will no longer support consumption. On the 
positive side, the strong rebound in equity markets 
– if maintained – could translate into a fall in the 
savings ratio via the wealth channel. There is 
indeed a strong negative correlation between 
households’ savings and financial wealth in the 
euro area. (4) Therefore, further strong rises in the 
savings ratio seem rather unlikely. 
Inflation bouncing back in November 
The euro area has experienced a prolonged period 
of disinflation over the past year, with annual 
HICP headline inflation falling to -0.7 % in July 
before bouncing back to 0.5 % in November.  
Against the background of upward base effects 
now setting in, the recent pick-up in oil prices and 
growing signs of economic recovery, euro-area 
inflation turned positive in November. The 
increase in November HICP largely reflected base 
effects, resulting from the movements in 
commodity prices a year ago coupled with higher 
month-on-month price increases. Underlying 
inflation (excluding energy and unprocessed food) 
remained stable at 1% y-o-y. 
HICP data for November show that annual 
inflation increased significantly in all euro-area 
countries, except for Ireland where HICP inflation 
remained negative at -2.8% y-o-y. Inflation was 
also still negative in Portugal (-0.8% y-o-y) and in 
Malta (-0.1% y-o-y). Among the largest euro-area 
countries, inflation increased to +0.8 % y-o-y in 
                                                        
(4) See European Commission (2009), ‘The interrelations 
between household savings, wealth and mortgage debt’, 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 8 No 3, Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs.  
Italy, to +0.5% y-o-y in France, to +0.4 % in 
Spain and to +0.3 % y-o-y in Germany.  
Graph I.1.9: Euro-area HICP inflation: 
composition 
(in %, Jan 2006 to November 2009) 
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Source: Commission services. 
In November, services remained the main positive 
contributor to euro-area overall inflation (0.7 pp), 
while energy (-0.2 pp) and unprocessed food (-0.1 
pp) contributed negatively – though to a much 
lesser extent than in October in the case of energy. 
Processed food and non-energy industrial goods 
jointly accounted for the remaining 0.1 pp.  
Oil prices surged by about 5 % in November from 
October, with the average price of a barrel of 
Brent crude oil rising from an average of EUR 
49.3 (USD 73.1) to EUR 51.5 (USD 76.9). The oil 
price increase lifted annual energy inflation by 
6pp to -2.4% in November. Future contracts 
suggest that oil prices will continue to rise in the 
coming months.  
An analysis of the drivers of inflation shows that 
the appreciation of the euro since mid-February 
has had a negligible impact on headline inflation. 
Wage inflation has also remained tame so far. It 
grew at an annual rate of 1.4 % in the third quarter 
of 2009, down from 3.6 % in the same period a 
year ago. Euro-area unit labour costs continued, 
however, to rise in the third quarter of 2009 (3.5% 
y-o-y), though at a more moderate rate than in the 
second quarter (4.6 % y-o-y). Since the beginning 
of 2009, the strong pick-up in unit labour costs, in 
spite of wage cuts, is the result of stumbling 
productivity (-3.1% y-o-y in 2009Q2 and -2.1 % 
in 2009Q3). Sluggish workforce adjustment in the 
face of a sharp GDP contraction has translated 
into a strong fall in productivity growth.  
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Surveys continue to point to higher confidence 
Improved short-term prospects for the euro area 
are reflected in overall encouraging survey 
indicators. In November, the Economic Sentiment 
Indicator (ESI) was up for the eighth consecutive 
month since its trough in March. However, it still 
remains significantly below its long-term average. 
Based on past experiences, the latest readings of 
the ESI are consistent with growth at 0.5 % q-o-q 
in the fourth quarter of 2009. This figure should, 
however, be interpreted with prudence due to the 
gap that opened during the crisis between what 
confidence indicators suggested and quarterly 
GDP growth.  
The increase in the ESI in the months of October 
and November compared to the third quarter were 
the result of a general improvement in sentiment 
in all sectors. Sentiment in industry was the main 
contributor to the overall improvement, followed 
by services and consumers. During that same 
period, all euro-area Member States, except for 
Cyprus, reported greater confidence. 
The increase in confidence in the industry and 
services sectors continued to be fuelled by the rise 
in expectations as well as by the more 
encouraging recent trends observed by firms. 
While expectations are now very close to their 
long-term average, recent trends still remain well 
below their historical average. This is, however, 
not unusual for an early recovery phase. Improved 
prospects are also reflected in the PMI for both 
manufacturing and services in the euro area. In 
contrast with the Commission surveys, 
developments of the PMI in October and 
November compared to the third quarter suggest 
greater improvement in the services than in the 
industry sector. In October, both PMIs stood 
above the 50 mark, suggesting expansion in these 
sectors. 
Graph I.1.10: Industry, services and consumer 
confidence, euro area  
(balances normalised, Jan 2000 to Nov 2009) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Country-level surveys broadly confirmed the 
positive trends. The German Ifo continued to 
increase in October and November. The 
improvements were broad-based across the 
different sectors, with the exception of retail trade, 
which fell. The breakdown of the Ifo shows that 
the spread between expectations and current 
conditions has been steadily increasing during the 
past three months, with the index on current 
conditions lagging behind. This suggests that the 
Ifo assessment of the current situation has lately 
 
Table I.1.2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2008-2009 
SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI Man.4) PMI Ser 5) IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average 100.6 0.0 84.6 52.3 54.4 96.9 -8.0 22.4
November 2008 76.6 -1.6 94.0 35.6 42.5 77.7 -25.0 -53.5
December 2008 68.7 -2.5 93.1 33.9 42.1 77.0 -31.3 -45.2
January 2009 67.2 -2.6 92.6 34.4 42.2 79.6 -29.0 -31.0
February 2009 65.3 -3.1 92.7 33.5 39.2 81.0 -32.5 -5.8
March 2009 64.6 -3.3 93.2 33.9 40.9 81.8 -34.3 -3.5
April 2009 67.3 -3.1 94.2 36.8 43.8 84.1 -30.7 13.0
May 2009 70.2 -3.0 95.4 40.7 44.8 86.2 -29.8 31.1
June 2009 73.2 -2.9 96.4 42.6 44.7 89.7 -24.3 44.8
July 2009 76.0 -2.7 97.8 46.2 45.7 90.6 -21.9 39.5
August 2009 80.8 -2.2 99.2 48.2 49.9 95.1 -19.2 56.1
September 2009 82.8 -2.1 100.4 49.3 50.9 95.8 -19.8 57.7
October 2009 86.1 -1.8 101.4 50.7 52.6 96.8 -15.8 56.0
November 2009 88.8 -1.6 - 51.2 53.0 98.9 -8.6 51.1
Source: 1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading 
indicator. 4) Bloomberg Purchasing Managers Index, manufacturing. 5) Bloomberg Purchasing Managers Index, services. 6) 
Business expectations, West Germany. 7) National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) ZEW Indicator of 
Economic Sentiment, Germany. 
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been less optimistic. The Belgian business 
confidence index (NBB) improved sharply in 
October and November. The index is now back to 
pre-crisis levels and very close to its long-term 
average.  
While all these surveys seem to point to higher 
growth during the fourth quarter, the first hard 
data for the fourth quarter is less encouraging. 
Indeed, data on industrial production remains very 
weak. In October 2009, industrial activity 
contracted further by 11.1% y-o-y.  
Short-term outlook and risks 
The Commission’s 2009 Autumn forecasts project 
0.2 % q-o-q growth for the last quarter of 2009. 
For 2009 as a whole, GDP is still set to fall by 
some 4 %. A gradual recovery is expected with 
GDP forecast to grow by ¾% in 2010 and by 
1½% in 2011. The near-term rebound in activity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
follows from improvements in the external 
environment and financial conditions, as well as 
from the significant fiscal and monetary policy 
measures put in place. Further out, a number of 
factors are set to restrain private demand and, 
thus, the strength of the recovery. In particular, 
labour-market conditions will remain weak.  
Inflation in the euro area is expected to remain 
subdued over the forecast horizon. HICP inflation 
is projected to average slightly over 1 % in 2010 
and at 1½% in 2011. While rising commodity 
prices are likely to put upward pressure on 
inflation, substantial slack in the economy and 
weak wage growth should have a dampening 
effect.  
The outlook for the euro-area economy as it 
emerges from recession is still uncertain, and 
subject to non-negligible but broadly balanced 
risks. 
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2. The impact of the crisis on the labour 
market 
Until the financial crisis broke in the summer of 
2007, euro-area labour markets had performed 
relatively well. The employment rate, at about 
66 % of the workforce, was approaching the 
Lisbon target, owing largely to significant 
increases in the employment rates of women and 
older workers. (5) Unemployment had declined to 
a rate of about 7.5 %, despite a very substantial 
increase in the labour force. Importantly, the 
decline in the unemployment rate had not led to a 
notable acceleration in inflation, implying that the 
level of unemployment at which labour shortages 
start to emerge along with rising wage pressures 
(i.e. structural unemployment) had declined. 
Graph I.2.1: Employment and participation 
rates in the euro area (y-o-y % change) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Graph I.2.2: Employment growth in the euro 
area (y-o-y % change) 
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Source: Commission services. 
                                                        
(5) Between 2000 and 2008 the employment rates of female 
(between 25 and 64 years) and older workers (between 55 
and 64 years) increased by about 7.1 pp and 10.1 pp, 
respectively. 
At the onset of the crisis, the bulk of job losses 
was concentrated in just a few Member States 
(Spain and Ireland), largely as a result of larger 
exposure to the direct consequences of the shocks. 
In 2009, the euro-area labour market recorded a 
pronounced slowdown with significant job losses 
occurring across many Member States and 
sectors. Against the background of a modest 
recovery in 2010, the unemployment rate is set to 
reach 10 ¾% by 2010 and to rise further to almost 
11% in 2011. On current policies, employment in 
the euro area is expected to fall in 2010 and 
remain unchanged in 2011. (6) 
Graph I.2.3: Employment growth by skills in the 
euro area (y-o-y % change) 
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Graph I.2.4: Employment growth by gender and 
youth in the euro area (y-o-y % change) 
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The labour market response has been quite 
heterogeneous across different socio-economic 
groups and countries (see Graphs I.2.3 and I.2.4). 
Workers with ‘weaker’ work contracts, less 
                                                        
(6) See also European Commission (2009), ‘Recent labour 
market developments and prospects’, European Economic 
Forecast - Autumn 2009, European Economy No. 10/2009, 
DG Economic and Financial Affairs, pp. 34-49. 
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qualified and less experienced workers have borne 
much of the brunt of the current recession. The 
advent of the crisis has had only minor effects on 
the employment of high-skilled workers, but it 
significantly hit the medium- and low-skilled, 
with annual employment growth in those groups 
falling to 2.2 % (from 4.1 % in 2007) and -1.7 % 
(from -0.3 % in 2007). At the country level, the 
labour market adjustment has so far been sizeable 
in Spain and Ireland and relatively limited in Italy, 
Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands. This 
difference is to some extent explained by the use 
of short-time employment schemes in the last 
group of countries and by a huge contraction of 
employment in the first due to the need for 
reallocating resources away from sectors with 
over-capacity and low productivity. So far, a 
reduction in the participation rate has been 
registered in only a few countries, namely 
Finland, Ireland, Italy and Portugal. 
Compared to the size of the output losses, the 
increase in unemployment in the euro area has 
been small, with the bulk of the remaining 
adjustment consisting of reductions in hours 
worked per person. (See Box I.2.1) Flexible 
working time arrangements, short-time working 
schemes and temporary closures may have 
prevented, though perhaps only delayed, more 
significant labour shedding so far. When inflows 
to unemployment dominate outflows from 
unemployment, measures that reduce the risks of 
losing jobs minimise the increase in 
unemployment during downturns and the loss of 
job-specific skills. Working time flexibility can be 
a source of variation of labour input, without 
causing additional hiring and firing or wage 
renegotiation costs, while preserving firm-specific 
human capital. Yet, a temporary reduction of the 
hours worked can be an effective tool to stabilise 
employment only if not accompanied by full 
compensation of hourly wages that keeps the 
monthly labour income unchanged. 
Some forms of temporary working time 
reductions are being largely supported by public 
funds in many euro-area countries. For example, 
in Italy, the number of hours of wage 
supplementation (CIG) was around 20 per 
thousand hours worked between January 2002 and 
July 2008. It rapidly picked up in November 2008 
and in April 2009 it reached its highest ever 
proportion since 2000 (110 per thousand hours 
worked in industry); in the second quarter of 2009 
about 10 % of full-time equivalent workers were 
on wage supplementation schemes. Similarly, in 
Germany short-time employment reached in 
March 2009 the highest level since the 1992-1993 
recession.  
These schemes have proved effective in 
containing wasteful labour shedding due to the 
demand shock, thus in cushioning the 
employment impact of the crisis in the short term. 
However, the major risk associated with these 
schemes is that of overstaffing, and hence a 
delayed dramatic impact on unemployment once 
the schemes end. In particular, the depth and 
nature of the crisis makes it particularly likely that 
restructuring will be necessary as the economy 
emerges from it (e.g. in the construction, financial 
services or automobile industries). Thus, if 
potential output is affected, (7) these schemes to 
some extent smooth out the required downward 
adjustment in employment levels.  
Graph I.2.5: Compensation per employee and 
negotiated wages, euro area (y-o-y % change) 
1
2
3
4
Apr-96 Oct-97 Apr-99 Oct-00 Apr-02 Oct-03 Apr-05 Oct-06 Apr-08 Oct-09
Negotiated wages
Compensation per employee
Source: Commission services. 
Graph I.2.5 shows the growth of compensation 
per employee and of negotiated wages for the 
euro area. After achieving a growth rate of 3.6 % 
in 2008Q3, compensation per employee slowed 
down considerably in the first half of 2009. Even 
so, nominal unit labour costs rose significantly by 
5.9 % y-o-y in 2009Q1, a rate not seen for more 
than a decade, as labour productivity was 
negatively affected by labour hoarding. As 
suggested by the graph, the decline in 
compensation per employee has been almost 
entirely led by the fall in the variable component  
                                                        
(7) See for instance: European Commission (2009), ‘Impact of 
the current economic and financial crisis on potential output’, 
European Economy — Occasional Paper No 49, Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs, June; 
 and: 
 European Commission (2009), ‘The impact of the economic 
and financial crisis on potential growth’, Quarterly Report on 
the Euro Area, Vol. 8 No 2, Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs. 
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Box I.2.1: The response of the euro-area labour market: comparison with previous recessions
Country differences notwithstanding, the overall increase in euro-area unemployment has remained fairly muted so 
far, given the large drop in output. This box compares the response of the euro-area labour market to the current 
downturn with previous ones and illustrates differences across euro-area Member States. The first graph on the left-
hand side compares developments in euro-area GDP during major downturns following the cyclical peak for a 
period of 8 quarters. Compared with previous recessions, the current episode is characterised by a much larger 
output loss. The second graph on the right-hand side does the same exercise for euro-area employment (measured in 
1 000 persons). Employment has so far been contracting more than in previous downturns. However, comparing the 
different changes in employment during past downturns with their respective output losses, the current fall in 
employment in the euro area appears to have been rather small compared to the significant output loss. This 
phenomenon can be explained by the importance of labour hoarding during the current recession, which is 
illustrated by the fall in the average hours worked in the euro area. A typical feature of the euro-area labour market 
is the protracted period of weak employment growth in the wake of a recession. Except in the early 2000s downturn, 
employment in the euro area did not return to its pre-recession level for several years. 
Real GDP developments during major downturns, euro 
area (index 100 at cyclical peak) (1) 
Employment developments during major downturns, 
euro area (index 100 at cyclical peak) (1) 
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(1) Five major downturns were identified with an HP filter 
for the 1970-2009 period. Successive cyclical peaks are 
1973Q4, 1979Q4, 1990Q4, 2000Q4 and 2008Q1. 
Source: Commission services. 
(1) Five major downturns were identified with an HP filter 
for the 1970-2009 period. Successive cyclical peaks are 
1973Q4, 1979Q4, 1990Q4, 2000Q4 and 2008Q1. 
Source: Commission services. 
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For the largest euro-area countries, the third graph 
compares unemployment developments since the 
respective latest business cycle peaks (the same method 
was used as above). Unemployment developments have 
been fairly heterogeneous across countries. 
Unemployment in Spain rocketed from 8.6 % in 2007Q4 
to 16.6 % in 2009Q3. France and Italy experienced an 
increase of 1.9 and 1.1 percentage points respectively. In 
contrast, Germany’s unemployment rate has remained 
broadly stable. A year into the current recession, the 
average hours worked have fallen in Italy and Germany 
below the business cycle peak but increased in France 
and Spain above the level of the beginning of the 
recession. Conversely, during the recession of the early 
1990s for instance, average hours worked remained 
mainly unchanged in France, Germany and Spain and 
increased in Italy. They even kept rising in France and 
Italy when the recession was over.  
         Source: Commission services. 
If the past is any guide, one would have expected a much higher increase in the jobless rate than that experienced so 
far. Even so, the labour market response has been relatively heterogeneous across countries, which, to some extent, 
is explained by the different incidence of labour hoarding. To minimise the risks of mass unemployment, many 
countries have introduced or made extensive use of government-sponsored schemes available to employers to 
supplement wages of workers working reduced hours. These schemes give firms the possibility of reducing their 
activity in case of short-term falls in industrial orders or other exceptional circumstances, while allowing employees 
to keep their contractual relationship.  
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of compensation, which has overshot to 
compensate for the slower change in negotiated 
wages. 
In fact, negotiated wages responded with a lag of 
one quarter, and only by the end of the year, as the 
weaknesses in the labour market started to 
become evident, did the gap between the two 
wages start to close. Looking forward, the growth 
in unit labour costs in the euro area is projected to 
be negative in 2010 and consistent with price 
stability in 2011. The relatively fast response of 
compensation per employee in the euro area 
during the current crisis compared to past crises is 
confirmed by an econometric analysis. 
Conversely, the analysis shows that negotiated 
wages are unreactive to the business cycle but do 
respond with a lag to a shock to compensations 
per employee (see Box I.2.2). 
Looking forward 
At this juncture, the major risks concern the 
possibility that unemployed people become 
disenfranchised from the labour market and, thus, 
that high unemployment does not curb the growth 
of real wages (i.e. becomes structural 
unemployment). Apart from being a constraint to 
the recovery in the short term, a decline in the 
labour supply may heavily affect the potential 
output. However, reforms in many countries have 
strengthened the labour market attachment of 
most vulnerable groups and a large reduction in 
the overall activity rate is less likely now than in 
the past. In addition, stricter eligibility conditions, 
uncertain labour market prospects for the main 
earner and considerable wealth losses created by 
the burst of various bubbles lead to negative  
 
wealth effects that induce other members of the 
household to put more effort into finding a job to 
compensate for the expected loss in household 
income and to smooth consumption. This ‘added’ 
worker effect means that, in periods of high 
unemployment, the labour supply of non-working 
spouses increases, as the consumption smoothing 
motive prevails over other factors, such as the low 
substitution of leisure time between husband and 
wife (for cultural reasons or lack of childcare 
services), that keeps women out of the labour 
market. There is evidence of added worker effects 
for the Great Depression (Eichengreen and Hatton 
1987). (8)  
The high degree of sectoral reallocation, due to 
strong structural imbalances in some sectors (i.e. 
construction, finance and automotive) raises 
concerns about the risk of hysteresis in 
unemployment. The time needed for reallocating 
workers between sectors may increase the 
structural rate of unemployment. Indirect 
evidence of the effect of sectoral reallocation on 
the structural unemployment rate can be gained by 
comparing the result of a regression of 
respectively the unemployment rate and the 
NAIRU on the measure of sectoral reallocation 
(Lilien index (9)). In the first case, a 1 percentage 
point increase in the dispersion of employment 
growth across sectors is accompanied by an 
increase in the unemployment rate of 0.6 pp. The 
same regression this time with the NAIRU as a 
measure of the structural rate of unemployment 
gives a response of 0.1 pp. Thus, looking ahead, 
the structural unemployment rate may increase in 
those countries faced with considerable sectoral 
reallocation. However, compared to the effect on 
the total unemployment rate, this increase is likely 
to be relatively small in the euro area as a whole.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
(8) Eichengreen, B. and T. Hatton (1988), ‘Interwar 
unemployment in international perspective’, Institute for 
Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series 
1040, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley. 
(9) The Lilien index is calculated as the weighted standard 
deviation of annual output growth by industry.  
 See Lilien D. M. (1982), ‘Sectoral shifts and cyclical 
unemployment’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90, 
pp. 777–793. 
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Box I.2.2: The response of wages to a GDP growth shock: a VAR analysis
In order to investigate how compensation per employee and negotiated wages fluctuate in response to an unexpected 
shock to GDP growth, a VAR analysis was carried out. It allows the interdependencies between the variables 
(growth in compensation per employee, in negotiated wages and of GDP) to be taken into account. The response of 
wages is identified assuming a contemporaneous causal structure, which implies that an unexpected shock to GDP 
growth in one quarter influences only the variable component in the same quarter, while negotiated wages change 
only in the following quarters. 
An unexpected shock to GDP growth triggers an adjustment mechanism where the variable component of wages 
adjusts in the same quarter, while negotiated wages respond with a lag of one quarter. These findings are based on 
the period 1996Q1-2009Q4. Yet if 2008 and 2009 are excluded from the sample, it turns out that nominal wages do 
not change in response to an unexpected GDP shock, which is consistent with the presence of nominal wage 
rigidities in the euro area. Thus, although there has been a response of wages during the current crisis, this has been 
particularly exceptional if judged with the metric of past historical experience. 
Looking more closely at the results of the VAR analysis, the graphs below give, respectively, the response of 
compensation per employee and negotiated wages to an unexpected shock to GDP growth. The first graph indicates 
that the growth of compensation per employee rises by 0.1 pp in the case of an unexpected positive shock to GDP 
growth of one standard deviation. The maximum effect is achieved after 2 quarters and dies out by the end of the 
year. After 4 quarters labour costs increase by about 0.4 pp. Conversely, the second graph shows that negotiated 
wages are unreactive to the business cycle. 
VAR model — Response of compensation per employee 
to GDP growth (in pp) (1) 
VAR model — Response of negotiated wages to GDP 
growth (in pp) (1) 
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(1) Identification based on Cholesky decomposition with the 
following order: growth in GDP, growth in comp. per 
employee and growth in negotiated wages; dotted lines 
indicate + or – 2se. 
Source: Commission services. 
(1) Identification based on Cholesky decomposition with the 
following order: growth in GDP, growth in comp. per 
employee and growth in negotiated wages; dotted lines 
indicate + or – 2se. 
Source: Commission services. 
On the other hand, as indicated in following graphs, negotiated wages do respond to a shock to the growth of 
compensations per employee. The effect reaches its maximum after 4 quarters and dies out only slowly in the 
following quarters. Thus, the effect on negotiated wages of a shock to the variable component of wages is quite 
persistent over time. After 2 years, negotiated wages are about 0.7 pp higher than before the shock. Since there is 
asymmetry in the response to positive and negative shocks in GDP, the same is valid for a contractionary shock. 
Thus, extending to the next two years the behaviour of wages during the crisis one should expect wage moderation 
in the near future. 
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Box (continued) 
 
VAR model — Response of compensation per employee 
to negotiated wages (in pp) (1) 
VAR model — Response of negotiated wages to 
compensation per employee (in pp) (1) 
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(1) Identification based on Cholesky decomposition with the 
following order: growth in GDP, growth in comp. per 
employee and growth in negotiated wages; dotted lines 
indicate + or – 2se. 
Source: Commission services. 
(1) Identification based on Cholesky decomposition with the 
following order: growth in GDP, growth in comp. per 
employee and growth in negotiated wages; dotted lines 
indicate + or – 2se. 
Source: Commission services. 
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3. The euro during the financial crisis 
Significant exchange rate volatility during the 
crisis  
Uncertainty about the consequences of the 
financial and economic crisis has resulted in 
highly volatile exchange rate markets, particularly 
during the acute phase of the crisis before March 
2009. The US dollar in particular has been 
affected by sudden changes in market sentiment. 
It appreciated strongly in the period following the 
intensification of the financial market turbulences 
in September 2008. Since March, when financial 
market conditions and the economic outlook 
started progressively to improve, the dollar fell 
against all major currencies (e.g. by 19 % against 
the euro and by 9 % against the Japanese yen as of 
18 November). The euro has also seen some 
remarkable swings against its trading partners’ 
currencies in recent quarters. In real effective 
terms, it fell by 7 % between its 13-year peak in 
April 2008 and November 2008 before 
appreciating again by the same extent until March 
2009 and stabilising thereafter. 
Graph I.3.1: Bilateral euro exchange rate 
movements  
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Source: EcoWin. 
Looking at bilateral exchange rate changes, it is 
striking that largely the same currencies that 
depreciated against the euro during the acute 
phase of the crisis, between September 2008 and 
February 2009, have appreciated since March 
2009 (see Graph I.3.1). In particular, the 
Australian and New Zealand dollar as well as the 
Brazilian real have rebounded markedly. 
Recently, several emerging market countries tried 
to avoid the appreciating trend in their currencies 
by foreign exchange market interventions (Asian 
economies) or the introduction of capital controls 
(Brazil). (10) The currency of the world’s largest 
emerging market economy, China, remained fixed 
to the US dollar throughout the crisis period (see 
Box I.3.1), which means that it depreciated 
substantially against the euro.  
Drivers of exchange rates during crisis  
What have been the driving factors behind these 
exchange rate movements? The relationship 
between the exchange rate and macro 
fundamentals is highly unstable and foreign 
exchange traders often change the weight they 
attach to different macro-indicators. (11) In this 
section, an eclectic approach is used to analyse a 
number of potential determinants of exchange rate 
movements and assess their relevance during the 
financial crisis. The analysis includes standard 
macroeconomic fundamentals, such as interest 
rates, inflation, or the current-account-to-GDP 
ratio, as well as data capturing the international 
investment position, such as an economy’s 
financial liabilities and foreign exchange reserves 
(both in relation to GDP). Data were collected for 
the 36 major trading partners of the euro area. (12) 
Following an approach proposed by Fratzscher 
(2009), for each of these determinants two 
contrasting groups are compared. (13) One group 
comprises countries with relatively stronger 
fundamentals or lower exposure relative to the 
average across all countries, while the comparison 
group’s countries have weaker fundamentals or 
higher exposure. Countries are assigned to one of 
the two groups according to whether they are 
positioned above or below the respective averages 
over the period 2005-2007. Averages are 
unweighted to avoid the results being dominated 
by the largest economies. 
                                                        
(10) The introduction of capital controls is aimed at ensuring 
financial stability more generally.  
(11) See e.g. Bacchetta, P. and E. van Wincoop (2009), ‘On the 
unstable relationship between exchange rates and 
macroeconomic fundamentals’, Paper presented at the ECB-
Bank of Canada Workshop on ‘Exchange rates: The global 
perspective’, June, Frankfurt. 
(12) The 36 countries are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, 
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, South 
Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 
(13) Fratzscher, M. (2009), ‘What explains global exchange rate 
movements during the financial crisis?’, ECB Working paper 
No 1060. 
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The crisis impacts exchange rate determinants 
The analysis detects a sharp break in summer 
2008 for many of the potential determinants of 
exchange rate movements. In particular, the level 
 
 
of money market rates appears to have been a 
driving force behind the euro’s exchange rate 
during the financial crisis. Currencies of countries 
with higher interest rates in the pre-crisis period 
depreciated, on average, by more than 17 per cent 
 
 
Box I.3.1: The Chinese exchange rate policy
Since July 2008, the Chinese authorities have kept the currency stable against the US dollar at around 6.83 Chinese 
yuan to the US dollar. This followed a 21% rise against the dollar in the three years to July 2008 and an informal 
peg against the US dollar in the years before 2005. In order to sustain the currency peg, the Chinese authorities 
intervene heavily in the foreign exchange market. China’s foreign exchange reserves increased to USD 2.3 trillion in 
September 2009, equivalent to 53% of its 2008 GDP or over two years of imports. This constitutes a rise of nearly 
20% compared to the beginning of the year and a doubling compared to the beginning of 2007. With the renminbi 
and the US dollar moving in synchronisation, the slide of the dollar has led the renminbi to depreciate by 17% 
against the euro since March 2009. This stands in sharp contrast to other emerging market currencies which have 
appreciated against the euro since spring 2009 amid improving risk sentiment. 
Chinese renminbi against EUR and USD  
("-" is an appreciation) 
EU trade balance with China 
(in EUR 100 million) 
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
CNY/EUR (lhs)
CNY/USD (rhs)
 
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Exports
Imports
Balance
 
Source: EcoWin. Source: EcoWin. 
China's exchange rate is particularly discussed in the context of global imbalances. China's current account surplus 
increased sharply after 2004, reaching 11.0% of GDP in 2007. Though the current account surplus narrowed in the 
course of the financial crisis, it remains substantial. The Commission services' Autumn Forecast expects a current 
account surplus for China of 7.3% of GDP in 2009, a decline to 6.1% in 2010 and to 5.6% in 2011. Due to the 
strong nominal growth rate, however, the forecast decline in the current account relative to GDP will not result in a 
decline in nominal terms, so China's current account surplus will remain very high. The Chinese trade surplus is also 
large with respect to the EU. By end-2008, the deficit of EU-China trade in goods had almost quadrupled in 
comparison with 2000, reaching about EUR 170 billion. (This compares to a trade deficit of the US with China of 
EUR 182 bn in 2008.) In 2009, the EU trade deficit with China reached EUR 63.2 billion in the first ten months of 
the year, with EU imports from China declining much faster (23.2%) than EU exports to China (decline by 8.8%). 
The sustained large current account surplus and the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves provide evidence of 
a significant undervaluation of the renminbi. The fixed exchange rate policy is also contributing to loose monetary 
conditions in China, fuelling the risk of asset price bubbles. There have been mounting international concerns over 
the Chinese currency policy. A European delegation by Jean-Claude Juncker (President of the Eurogroup), ECB 
president Jean-Claude Trichet, and Joaquín Almunia (Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs) raised the 
issue of the Chinese currency peg in talks with the Chinese authorities in November. Chinese Prime Minister Wen in 
turn described the renewed peg to the dollar during the crisis as a contribution to stability. As the Chinese and the 
global economies were still weak, it was too early to remove the measures taken in response to the crisis. However, 
the recent depreciation of the US dollar was a concern in terms of the long-term value of China's USD reserve 
holdings.  
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against the euro between August 2008 and end-
2008 (Graph I.3.2). (14) Since spring 2009, this 
trend has somewhat reversed, as currencies of 
high interest rate countries have appreciated 
against the euro on average by 5 % since 10 
March 2009. At the same time, low interest rate 
countries were subject to lower exchange rate 
volatility, and even appreciated slightly against 
the euro in autumn 2008. 
Graph I.3.2: Euro movements against countries 
with high and low money market rates 
(cumulated changes in %, 1 July 2008 =0) (1) 
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(1) Positive values indicate euro appreciation against country 
group. 
Source: EcoWin. 
The different phases in the relationship between 
interest rates and exchange rate point to an 
important role for carry trade flows. Carry trades 
are most attractive under the market conditions 
which were in place until 2007, in the period of 
Great Moderation. Exchange rate volatility was 
low, allowing investors to generate profits from 
interest rate differentials by borrowing in low-
yielding currencies (e.g. Japan and Switzerland) 
and investing in high-yielding currencies (e.g. the 
Australian dollar). In line with that, low interest 
rate countries depreciated more against the euro 
than high interest rate countries in the pre-crisis 
period — contrary to the prediction of uncovered 
interest parity. As risk aversion increased with the 
first wave of financial market turbulences in 
summer 2007, the retrenchment in sentiment and 
the unwinding of carry trades coincided with a 
sharp depreciation of high-yielding currencies.  
                                                        
(14) In mid-August 2008 the cumulated bilateral exchange rate 
changes of the euro against the high interest rate group were -
5.5 % compared to 1 July 2008, while the cumulated moves 
were 11.8 % at end-2008. This results in appreciation of the 
euro by more than 17 % against the high interest rate group 
over that period. 
Since spring 2009, the combination of stabilising 
financial markets and improving prospects for the 
global economy has increased risk appetite, 
renewed interest in carry trades and led to an 
appreciation of high-yielding currencies, such as a 
number of emerging market currencies. There is 
also some evidence that, due to the very low 
interest rate environment in the US, the US dollar 
has taken the place of the Japanese yen as the 
major funding currency in these carry trades.    
Graph I.3.3: Euro movements against countries 
with positive and negative current account 
balances  
(cumulated changes in %, 1 July 2008 =0) (1) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
Currencies of countries with low foreign 
exchange reserves and high current account 
deficits were, on average, also associated with 
stronger depreciation against the euro (Graphs 
I.3.3 and I.3.4). Interestingly, both the level of 
foreign exchange reserves and the current account 
deficits only became significant during the 
financial crisis period when investors became 
more concerned about the vulnerability of a 
country to sudden capital flight and a currency 
crisis. In this period, currencies of countries with 
relatively low foreign exchange reserves, such as 
the Latin American countries Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico, or currencies of countries with high 
current account deficits, such as the Central and 
Eastern European economies Hungary, Poland, 
Romania or the Czech Republic, depreciated 
strongly against the euro. Since March 2009, this 
trend has been reversed. Countries with a current 
account deficit and/or low foreign reserves in the 
pre-crisis period appreciated against the euro as 
the sudden slump in world trade and the relatively 
sharp decline in domestic demand led to a 
considerable unwinding in current account 
imbalances and a decrease in the external  
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vulnerabilities of these countries. Around half of 
the previous exchange rate changes between 
September 2008 and March 2009 have thus been 
reversed over recent months. 
Graph I.3.4: Euro movements against countries 
with high and low foreign exchange reserves  
(cumulated changes in %, 1 July 2008 =0) (1) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
The evidence of a structural break in exchange 
rate movements in summer 2008 (summer 2007 
for the case of interest rates) becomes also 
apparent when looking at net external assets 
(gross external assets minus gross external 
liabilities, as a share of GDP). While countries 
with high net external assets (e.g. Japan, China, 
Norway, Switzerland, Singapore) depreciated 
against the euro in the pre-crisis period, they kept 
their currencies relatively stable or even 
appreciated against the euro in the crisis period.  
Graph I.3.5: Euro movements against countries 
with high and low net external assets 
(cumulated changes in %, 1 July 2008 =0) (1) 
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group. 
Source: EcoWin. 
By contrast, currencies of countries with low net 
external assets, among them many emerging 
  
market economies but also the United Kingdom, 
came under downward pressure in the course of 
the financial market turbulences and depreciated, 
on average, by 14 % against the euro between 
mid-September 2008 and mid-March 2009. The 
most likely explanation is that countries with 
external assets were better able to withstand the 
withdrawal of capital by repatriating capital from 
abroad and meeting foreign exchange liquidity 
demands. (15) 
Purchasing power parity suggests a long-run 
relationship between inflation differentials and 
(nominal) exchange rate developments. Inflation 
differentials visibly played a role in the pre-crisis 
period when high-inflation countries depreciated 
more strongly against the euro than low-inflation 
countries. By contrast, they have hardly played a 
role since the beginning of the crisis when 
inflationary concerns receded (Graph I.3.6). 
During the crisis period, the euro appreciated 
against the currencies of a number of high-
inflation countries, in particular Argentina, 
Hungary and Turkey, but it also gained significant 
value against the currencies of some low-inflation 
countries such as the United Kingdom, Poland 
and Sweden. Inversely, the euro depreciated 
against both some high-inflation countries (US, 
Thailand, Philippines) and a number of low-
inflation countries (Japan, China, Switzerland). 
Graph I.3.6: Euro movements  
against countries with high and low inflation  
(cumulated changes in %, 1 July 2008=0) (1) 
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(15) See for instance Fratzscher (2009) for the US dollar. 
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Summary and conclusions  
The graphical analysis provides some evidence 
that the financial crisis significantly affected the 
driving forces of exchange rates. In the acute 
phase of the crisis, the euro appreciated more 
against high-yielding than against low-yielding 
currencies, reflecting a retrenchment in risk 
sentiment and pointing to an important role for the 
unwinding of carry trade flows. The general 
increase in risk awareness also affected countries 
with low foreign exchange reserves, high current 
account deficits and low net external assets that 
saw their currencies depreciating against the euro. 
Since March 2009, these trends have been partly 
reversed. Interestingly, a more traditional 
determinant of exchange rate movements like 
inflation differentials, though important in the pre-
crisis period, seems to have played a benign role 
throughout the crisis. (16) 
Three broad conclusions emerge from the above 
analysis. First, interest rate differentials are likely 
to remain a key theme on foreign exchange 
markets especially once monetary exit begins. 
While some smaller economies have started to 
tighten their monetary policy, the world's major 
central banks are expected to keep interest rates 
low for an extended period of time. This suggests 
an ongoing supportive environment for carry 
trades. There is also some evidence that the major 
carry trade has shifted from the Japanese yen to  
  
                                                        
(16) These results are also robust to variations in the specification 
with respect to the country sample and the reference period. 
For example, according to the de facto exchange rate regime 
classification by Reinhart and Rogoff, seven of the 36 
countries in our sample had a fixed currency regime in the 
period under consideration (Bulgaria, China, Denmark, 
Estonia, Hong Kong, Latvia and Lithuania). Excluding these 
countries from the sample hardly affects the results. 
Similarly, adjusting the reference period for the classification 
of the countries in one of the two groups from 2005-2007 to 
2004-2006 has no impact on the results. 
the US dollar which could make the potential for 
carry trades even bigger. Second, the current crisis 
could further heighten emerging market 
economies’ incentives to self-insure via reserves 
accumulation. In the aftermath of the current 
crisis, developing and emerging market countries 
may well conclude that they need to further 
stockpile large foreign exchange reserves to 
safeguard against financial crises. However, such 
a strategy is neither helpful to facilitate global 
macroeconomic adjustment, nor is it in the long-
term economic interest of the economies 
concerned. Measures at the international level 
therefore aim at providing insurance against 
sudden capital flight without implying the need to 
run large current account surpluses that can be 
destabilising by contributing to global imbalances. 
Most importantly, the IMF has expanded its 
resources available for assistance to its members 
and strengthened the role of the SDR (Special 
Drawing Rights). Third, exchange rate changes 
during the financial crisis period have indeed 
hardly been sufficient to result in a significant 
(further) reduction in global imbalances. Since 
July 2008 current account deficit countries have, 
on average, depreciated by 5 % against the euro, 
compared to an average 1 % depreciation for 
current account surplus countries. Further 
appreciation by surplus countries would thus help 
underpin a more structural reduction of global 
imbalances.  
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4. The economic crisis and public 
attitudes towards structural reforms in 
the euro area 
While the economic situation is improving, policy 
makers face the formidable challenge of devising 
and implementing exit strategies from the crisis. 
These will entail difficult choices and decisions 
on the most appropriate ways to exit from the 
temporary rescue measures that were put in place 
to limit the immediate impact of the crisis but also 
on longer-term policy strategies to boost potential 
output and ensure economic sustainability. The 
crisis has had a major impact on the level of 
potential output in the euro area and there is a risk 
that potential growth might also be negatively 
affected unless appropriate policy action is 
taken. (17) Such policy responses will inter alia 
have to build on structural reforms aimed at 
improving the functioning of product and labour 
markets and enhancing the quality and 
sustainability of public finances. 
However, the implementation of structural 
reforms may meet political resistance. Structural 
reforms tend to carry short-run adjustment costs, 
which are often concentrated on certain groups in 
society, while benefits may take time to 
materialise and are generally broadly distributed. 
Consequently, reform-minded governments need 
to get involved in complex and frequently lengthy 
negotiations with stakeholders. 
There is no magic formula for successful 
reforms. (18) However, general public support 
certainly plays a very important role as it may 
provide a strong mandate to the government and 
increase political acceptability of reforms. In the 
current context, it is useful to see whether and 
how the economic crisis has impacted on public 
perceptions of the need for reform, as public 
opinion can change markedly under the influence 
of external factors. If the crisis made structural 
reforms more acceptable for the population at 
large, policy makers could find it easier to 
implement the necessary measures. 
Indeed, it is often argued that a crisis offers a 
window of opportunity for reforms as it makes the 
                                                        
(17) See European Commission (2009) ‘Impact of the current 
economic and financial crisis on potential output’, European 
Economy. Occasional Paper No 49; and the Quarterly Report 
on the Euro Area, Volume 8 No 2 (2009). 
(18) For an overview see OECD (2009) ‘The political economy of 
reform: Lessons from pensions, product markets and labour 
markets in ten OECD countries’, OECD, Paris. 
deficiencies of the status quo apparent. (19) The 
public at large may become increasingly aware of 
the general need for reform as it is exposed to the 
hardship aggravated by the functioning of the 
existing institutions. Alternatively, the crisis may 
erode the rents arising to specific interest groups, 
which could reduce their opposition to reform. 
This general ‘crisis effect’ may intensify the 
perceptions of the necessity to push forward with 
reforms. 
On the other hand, support for reforms may not 
change considerably or even swing in the opposite 
direction. The former may happen if the crisis 
does not significantly affect perceptions of the 
need for reform because its structural causes 
(beyond the financial sector) are not properly 
perceived by the wider public. The crisis could 
also increase perceived uncertainty as to what 
should be the appropriate policy responses. 
Moreover, as the crisis is sometimes seen as an 
exemplification of a failure of market institutions, 
there could also be a setback and the public could 
turn against policy measures aimed at removing 
the constraints on free play of market forces. At 
the very least, the public may be more inclined 
towards strengthening labour market institutions 
that mitigate the short-run impact of the crisis. 
While such measures can indeed temporarily help 
cushion the implications of the downturn, they 
also hinder adjustment in the longer run and lead 
to higher structural unemployment. 
To explore the issue of public attitudes towards 
structural reform, this analysis exploits the data 
from three consecutive annual Flash 
Eurobarometer surveys on public attitudes and 
perceptions in the euro area. Since 2007, these 
surveys contain a series of questions on structural 
reforms. These questions enquire inter alia about 
the respondents’ views on the need for economic 
reforms to improve the performance of the 
national economy and the acceptability of 
different ways to finance reforms. In addition, the 
survey collects relevant information on views 
concerning the EU’s involvement in reform 
processes and the usefulness of cross-country 
exchange of best practices. As the fieldwork 
usually takes place in September, we can thus 
compare the data in the pre-crisis period 
(September 2007) with those at the outset of the 
global crisis (September 2008) and during the 
period in which the impact of the crisis was fully 
felt (September 2009). This allows to assess the 
                                                        
(19) See Rodrik, D. (1996), ‘Understanding economic policy 
reform’, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.34, pp 9-41. 
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impact of the crisis on public attitudes regarding 
structural reforms. 
While the surveys provide unique information 
and, to the best of our knowledge, there is no 
other more appropriate source of data on public 
support for reform, the results should be seen as 
very tentative. Especially, the question on 
perception of the need for structural reforms to 
improve the functioning of the economy is 
worded in a rather general way, without being 
specific about the reform measures in question. 
This presents a significant shortcoming as the 
support for reform will probably vary 
considerably depending on the type of reform 
(e.g. measures to boost innovation are likely to be 
widely accepted while reforms in labour markets 
often raise opposition). Neither is it clear that all 
the respondents are fully aware of what structural 
reforms entail. Consequently, some may express 
their agreement with the need for reforms to 
improve the functioning of the economy even 
though they would disapprove of specific 
measures proposed by the government once they 
realise their full implications. Finally, the 
available data is too limited to verify the 
robustness of the findings with a more rigorous 
econometric analysis. Nevertheless, an analysis of 
the aggregate perceptions and especially their 
changes can still be useful in improving our 
understanding of how crises can affect support for 
reforms. 
Perceptions of the need for structural reform 
have increased in most euro-area countries … 
For the euro area as a whole, public perceptions of 
the need for structural reforms have been stable 
over time. Around 4/5 of the respondents agree 
that ‘there is a need for significant reforms to 
improve the performance of our economy’. The 
shares of those who disagree with the need to 
reform and those who ‘don’t know’ have also 
been stable (at around 12 % and 7 % 
respectively). (20) However, this aggregate picture 
conceals very different developments at Member 
State level. Some of them have seen significant 
shifts towards greater awareness of the need for 
reforms while a few others have had the opposite 
experience (Graph I.4.1). 
                                                        
(20) As was explained above, the crisis may have had an impact 
on the degree of uncertainty regarding the perceived need for 
reform. It is, therefore, useful to analyse the developments in 
the share of respondents who ‘don’t know’ as it can provide 
some indication as to whether the crisis reduced the hesitation 
of some about the need to reform or whether it increased the 
doubts about the appropriate policies to be implemented. 
Graph I.4.1: The perceived need for structural 
reforms in 2007 and 2009  
(% of total responses) 
FI
SI
PT
AT
NL
LU
IT
IE
FR
ES
EL
DE
BE
50
60
70
80
90
100
50 60 70 80 90 100
2007
20
09
Source: Commission services. 
The crisis coincided with increases in perceptions 
that there was a need for economic reforms in the  
vast majority of euro-area countries. This lends 
some support to the assumption that economic 
downturns tend to boost support for reforms. In 
the pre-crisis period (September 2007), IT (89 %), 
EL (89 %), PT (86 %), FR (84 %) and SI (81 %) 
were the countries that recorded the highest levels 
of awareness of the need for structural reforms, 
while the share of respondents who saw the need 
for such reforms was the lowest in FI (54 %), 
followed at some distance by NL (61 %) and LU 
(67 %). By September 2009, the share of 
respondents who saw the need for significant 
reforms increased in almost all euro-area 
countries, with only a few (important) exceptions: 
BE (-10 %), FR (-4.6 %) and IT (-1.5 %).  
The significant drops in the affirmative answers to 
the question on the need for structural reforms in 
BE and to a lesser extent also in FR was due to 
the increase in the share of respondents who 
‘don’t know’. If the share of only those who 
replied either yes or no is considered (i.e. 
excluding the ‘don’t knows’) the drops are 
considerably smaller (Graph I.4.2). (21) The 
highest increases were recorded in countries 
which were more significantly hit by the financial 
and economic crisis: IE (+16 %), FI (+13 %), ES 
(+9 %), LU (+8 %). As a result, the group of 
countries with the highest levels of pro-reform 
perceptions has expanded and includes EL (90 %), 
IE (90 %), ES (89 %), IT (88 %), PT (88 %), SI 
                                                        
(21) BE (-1.4 %) and FR (-2.2 %). For IT the drop actually 
increased to -4.1 %. In BE, the doubling of the share of ‘don’t 
knows’ is difficult to explain and it may possibly reflect a 
problem with the data. 
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(85 %) and the two countries that joined them in 
2008: MT (83 %) and CY (81 %). 
Graph I.4.2: The perceived need for structural 
reforms in 2007 and 2009)  
(% of responses excluding ‘don’t knows’) 
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Overall, the economic crisis seems to have 
resolved part of the uncertainty among the 
population about the need for further structural 
reforms in a number of countries, as the shares of 
‘don’t knows’ decreased: LU (-9 %), ES (-6 %), FI 
(-4 %), IT (-3 %), IE (-2 %), PT (-2 %). These 
decreases can be associated with increases in 
support for reforms in all of these countries. (22) In 
contrast, the share of ‘don’t knows’ answers 
increased somewhat in FR (+3 %) and NL (+2 %), 
in both cases ‘transforming’ into disagreement 
with reforms. 
These developments point to two patterns that are 
important for policy makers: 
• in ‘normal times’, the level of perceptions of 
the need for reform seems to some extent to 
reflect the objective need for reform. The 
countries that recorded the highest shares of 
respondents that agreed that reforms were 
needed in the pre-crisis period generally 
belonged among those that featured important 
structural weaknesses. (23) While this might 
not be a surprising finding, it is encouraging 
for policy makers to see that the public realises 
the existing shortcomings, which may be a 
                                                        
(22) In Italy, this effect was outweighed by a larger increase in the 
share of respondents that did not agree that reforms were 
needed. 
(23) See for example the Commission’s annual progress reports 
on the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs 
(www.ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs) or the OECD Going for 
Growth reports. 
stepping stone to implementing policies to 
address them; (24) 
• the (significant) changes in perceptions appear 
to be driven by (short-run) macroeconomic 
developments (see Graph I.4.3). The steep 
drops in economic activity and the ensuing 
rises in unemployment appear to be closely 
associated with increases in the likelihood that 
respondents agree with the need for reform. 
This opens a window of opportunity for policy 
makers to push forward with the needed 
reforms. On the other hand, there is a risk that 
the support for reforms drops with the same 
speed once economic activity picks up again. 
Graph I.4.3: Changes in public perceptions of 
the need to reform and difference in real GDP 
growth rates (in pp) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The results of simple statistical analysis appear to 
be largely in line with these tentative conclusions. 
Table I.4.1 shows the Pearson correlation 
coefficients between the levels and changes in 
public attitudes and a number of variables which 
capture the macroeconomic conditions, the state 
of public finances and the structural 
characteristics of the economy. (25) (26) There 
                                                        
(24) Obviously, this does not provide any specific information on 
what policies the public would find appropriate for improving 
the functioning of the respective national economies. It may 
well be that the reform measures put forward by the 
government would not be considered as acceptable. 
(25) The focus on macroeconomic conditions and fiscal variables 
is based on the findings of the empirical literature, which 
identified them as potentially important determinants of 
progress in implementing structural reforms (e.g. Høj, J., V. 
Galasso, G. Nicoletti and T. Dang (2006),‘The political 
economy of structural reform — Empirical evidence from 
OECD countries’, OECD Working Paper 
ECO/WKP(2006)29; or IMF (2004), ‘Fostering structural 
reforms in industrial countries’, World Economic Outlook). 
(26) The correlation coefficients reported in the table are based on 
contemporaneous effects as public opinions probably react 
with a relatively short time lag to changes in external 
conditions. The use of lagged values yields very similar 
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appears to be a statistically significant correlation 
between the levels of agreement with the need for 
reforms and labour market variables such as the 
rates of unemployment and employment. This is 
rather intuitive as labour market performance is 
likely to affect public perceptions of the need for 
significant reforms. There is also significant 
statistical association with public finances 
variables — the levels of budgetary deficit and 
public debt. Finally, a number of variables 
capturing the structural features of the economy 
are correlated with public perceptions of the need 
for reforms. These range from labour market 
institutions (e.g. NAWRU and marginal effective 
tax rates), product market regulations (e.g. OECD 
PMR index, specific Fraser indexes or specific 
World Bank Doing Business indexes) to 
investment in R&D. 
Changes in public attitudes are almost exclusively 
associated with changes in macroeconomic 
conditions (e.g. changes in unemployment, 
growth and output gap) and fiscal variables (both 
changes in deficits and debt). All correlation 
coefficients have the expected sign. The strength 
of these correlations has decreased during the 
                                                                                  
results given the high degree of inertia in most of the 
structural variables. 
crisis period and it is only the change in output 
growth that continues to be significantly 
correlated with support for reforms. (27) 
… but the willingness to accept the potential 
costs of reform is relatively low. 
High recognition of the need for structural 
reforms does not necessarily translate into strong 
support for or acceptance of such reforms. 
Especially, if reform measures entail budgetary 
costs, there might be a need to increase tax 
revenues or reduce other budgetary expenditures. 
Consequently, support for reform may weaken 
considerably if the public is not prepared to bear 
the related costs. The questions in the survey 
which enquire about support for two alternative 
ways to generate necessary budgetary resources 
                                                        
(27) These results only show a relative strength of statistical 
association between these variables and do not allow 
conclusions to be drawn on the causality. Also, there is a high 
degree of multicolinearity among the ‘explanatory’ variables, 
which makes it difficult to ascertain which of them are the 
actual drivers of the levels/changes in public attitudes. As 
already mentioned, the data limitations (both in terms of the 
low number of observations and the length of the time series) 
do not allow robust econometric testing of these conjectures. 
Nevertheless, the results of a number of simple regressions 
appear not to contradict the presented results. 
 
Table I.4.1: Correlation coefficients between level/changes of public perceptions on the need for reform 
and possible determinants 
2009 2008 2007 2008-2009 2007-2008 2008-2009 2007-2008
level level level change change change change
Unemployment rate (1) 0.48* 0.34 0.52* 0.19 -0.05 ∆ unemployment rate 0.34 0.69*
Employment rate (1) -0.422 -0.48* -0.53* 0.23 -0.13 ∆ Employment rate -0.38 -0.37
GDP growth (1) -0.03 -0.1 -0.34 -0.36 -0.54* ∆ GDP growth -0.45* -0.60*
GDP per capita (1) -0.01 -0.15 -0.35 -0.27 -0.64* ∆ GDP per capita -0.29 -0.56*
Output gap (% GDP) (1) -0.09 -0.51* -0.44 -0.23 -0.57* ∆ Output gap (% GDP) -0.4 -0.59*
Inflation (HICP) (1) -0.28 0.22 0.38 0.06 0.04 ∆ Inflation (HICP) 0.18 -0.22
Budgetary deficit (% GDP) (1) -0.60* -0.67* -0.78* -0.05 -0.23 ∆ Budgetary deficit (% GDP) -0.36 -0.54*
Public debt (% GDP) (1) 0.23 0.41 0.58* -0.43 -0.21 ∆ Public debt (% GDP) 0.24 0.54*
GDP per capita (in PPS) (1) -0.3 -0.26 -0.46 -0.01 0.54* ∆ GDP per capita (in PPS) -0.19 -0.68*
NAWRU (1) (6) 0.43* 0.35 0.55* 0.12 -0.08 ∆ NAWRU 0.32 0.68*
METR (2) (7) . -0.76* -0.73* . -0.08 ∆ METR . -0.07
Govt revenues (% GDP) (1) -0.58* -0.56* -0.32 -0.02 -0.56* ∆ Govt revenues (% GDP) -0.06 -0.46
Tax burden (% GDP) (1) -0.48* -0.29 -0.08 -0.3 -0.42 ∆ Tax burden (% GDP) -0.04 -0.44
R&D expenditures (% GDP) (2) -0.55* -0.77* -0.67* 0.41 -0.31 ∆ R&D expenditures (% GDP) . .
PMR (3) -0.2 0.47 -0.68* -0.11 0.27 ∆ PMR 0.26 0.24
Fraser index (4) -0.28 -0.48* -0.68* 0.42 0.22 ∆ Fraser index . .
Fraser index  –  size of govern. (4) 0.73* 0.55* 0.51* 0.1 0.15 ∆ Fraser index  –  size of govern. . .
Fraser index – market regulation(4) -0.45* -0.67* -0.81* 0.51* 0.16 ∆ Fraser index – market regulation . .
Start-up conditions – costs (5) 0.49* 0.56* 0.49* -0.33 0.32 ∆ Start-up conditions – costs 0.06 0.42
Enfor. of contracts – procedures (5) 0.49* 0.43 0.52* -0.07 -0.25 ∆ Enfor. of contracts – procedures -0.60* -0.04
Enforcement of contracts – time (5) 0.49* 0.54* 0.52* -0.23 -0.01 ∆ Enforcement of contracts – time . 0.28
State of public finances
Structural features
Macroeconomic conditions
*indicates the correlation coefficients significant at 10 % level. 
Source: 1) AMECO; 2) Structural Indicators Database, Eurostat; 3) OECD — Product market regulation (PMR) index (data 
for 2008); 4) Fraser Institute — Fraser index of economic freedom (data for 2007); 5) World Bank — 2010 Doing Business; 
6) Non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment; 7) Marginal effective tax rate (one-earner couple with two children at 33 % 
of the average earnings); Commission services. 
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for reform – cuts in public spending and tax 
increases – help to cast some light on this issue. 
Indeed, the respondents are considerably more 
sceptical once asked about different ways to 
finance reforms: for the euro area as a whole, 
around 40 % of them would agree that the 
potential costs of structural reforms should be 
financed through reductions in public 
expenditures, e.g. social benefits, and only 17 % 
would accept increases in taxes. While the 
aggregate share of those willing to accept 
expenditure reductions has remained relatively 
stable compared to previous years (39 % in 2007 
and 43 % in 2008), the economic crisis has had a 
significant impact on the share of respondents 
who would agree with reforms financed through 
higher taxes (an increase of approximately 5 pp 
compared to 13 % in 2008 and 12 % in 2007). If 
the ‘don’t know’ answers are excluded, the results 
are broadly the same: around 44 % of respondents 
do not oppose spending cuts (a mild increase of 
less than 2 pp compared to 2007) and 18 % agree 
with tax increases (an increase of almost 5 pp in 
comparison with 2007).  
At the country level, financing reforms through 
the streamlining of public expenditures is 
supported by an absolute majority of respondents 
in FR (55 %), IE (51 %) and NL (51 %) and a 
relative majority in IT (47 %) and BE (39 %) (28) 
(see Graph I.4.4). Respondents in MT (24 %), FI 
(24 %), DE (27 %), SK (30 %) and PT (30 %) are 
the least enthusiastic in this respect.  
Graph I.4.4: Acceptability of different ways to 
finance reforms – reducing expenditures (in %) 
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Tax increases as a way to finance reforms are 
found relatively most acceptable in FI (42 %, an 
                                                        
(28) A relative majority refers to ‘yes’ answers exceeding ‘no’ 
answers, i.e. excluding ‘don’t know’ answers. 
18 pp increase on 2007), IE (33 %), EL (31 %) and 
ES (27 %), while they find limited support in PT 
(7 %), IT (11 %), MT (12 %), FR (13 %) and BE 
(14 %) (see Graph I.4.5). In contrast with the 
question on spending reductions, there is no 
absolute or relative majority of respondents 
favouring tax increases in any euro-area country. 
Overall, there appears to be a general negative 
relationship between agreement with increasing 
taxes and the actual size of the overall tax burden 
in the economy. There are two outliers, though: 
Finland (with a high overall tax burden and high 
willingness to accept further tax increases) and 
Slovakia (despite a low tax burden the 
respondents are not ready to accept tax hikes). 
Graph I.4.5: Acceptability of different ways to 
finance reforms – increasing taxes (in %) 
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Overall, the results also point to significant 
differences among euro-area countries concerning 
public preferences on the mix of measures to 
secure financing for potentially costly reforms 
(see Graph I.4.6). Consequently, euro-area 
governments might need to take this constraint 
into account when designing the overall exit 
strategies from the crisis. Respondents in some 
countries do not find acceptable either public 
expenditure reductions or tax increases (e.g. MT, 
DE, PT, SK, AT and SI). In contrast, respondents 
in several countries (IE, EL, ES and NL) show 
relatively weaker opposition to both of these 
instruments, although the relative preference 
continues to be biased towards public expenditure 
cuts. (29) The Finns have a fairly clear preference 
for increasing taxes while the Italians and the 
                                                        
(29) This relative preference of the public for benefit reductions as 
compared to tax increases provides some support for 
pursuing policies aimed at increasing the quality of public 
finances, by inter alia changing the composition of public 
expenditures towards growth-enhancing items, and 
documents some scepticism about increasing the size of the 
government. 
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French tend to prefer reductions in public 
expenditures. 
Graph I.4.6: The relative preferences of 
respondents for the financing mixes 
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The perceived role of the EU in the process of 
structural reform 
At the beginning of 2010, the European 
Commission will come up with proposals on the 
new strategy for coordinating structural reforms in 
the EU that will succeed the current Lisbon 
Strategy for Growth and Jobs. The results of the 
surveys provide fairly strong support for EU 
involvement in the national reform processes, as 
60 % of respondents in the euro area believe that 
the EU should play an active role in the domestic 
reform process. (30) A similar share of respondents 
thinks that reforms in other EU countries may 
induce their own government to introduce 
reforms. This indicates considerable scope for the 
exchange of best practices and peer pressure — 
areas where the EU can make a substantial 
contribution. The survey results have been fairly 
stable over time. It is interesting to note that the 
shares of ‘don’t know’ answers to these questions 
were somewhat higher than in the preceding 
questions, which may indicate that there is some 
scope for better communicating the EU’s potential 
contributions. If only the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers 
are considered, 68 % of respondents are in favour 
of EU involvement in national reform processes 
and 72 % think that reforms implemented abroad 
stimulate the domestic reform process.  
As regards individual countries, the highest levels 
of support for active EU involvement are recorded 
                                                        
(30) It should also be noted that the question refers to active 
involvement of the EU, which may be interpreted as going 
beyond the current soft approach to policy coordination. 
Therefore, the actual support for weaker forms of EU 
involvement might be even higher. 
in ES (78 %), CY (74 %), IT (73 %), PT (72 %), IE 
(71 %), EL (67 %) and MT (67 %), and in all other 
euro-area countries, except from AT (30 %), there 
is at least a relative majority in favour. As regards 
the effectiveness of cross-border peer 
pressure/exchange of best practices, the most 
enthusiastic respondents are found in IE (77 %), 
EL (77 %), PT (73 %) and MT (71 %). Relatively 
lower levels of agreement are recorded in BE 
(57 %), DE (58 %), CY (58 %) and IT (60 %). 
However, in these countries too there is a very 
high absolute majority of respondents who believe 
in the benefits of cross-border political economy 
spillovers of reforms. 
Graph I.4.7: Public attitudes towards the EU’s 
role in the reform processes 
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Tentative conclusions 
The present focus represents a first attempt to 
exploit the annual Flash Eurobarometer surveys 
on public attitudes and perceptions in the euro 
area. The tentative conclusions of this analysis 
indicate that the current crisis has indeed had a 
significant impact on the perceived need for 
structural reform in euro-area countries. In most 
countries, the perceived need for reform has 
increased, which could have a positive impact on 
the ability of governments to proceed with needed 
reforms. The changes in perceptions seem to have 
been largely driven by recent macroeconomic 
developments, with the countries that were hit the 
most severely by the crisis experiencing the 
largest increases in the perceived need for 
reforms. This could open a window of opportunity 
for reform-minded governments. However, the 
support for reform has declined in a limited 
number of countries (BE, FR and IT). The survey 
data also show that, in normal times, the general 
awareness of the need for reform appears to be 
related to the objective need for reform as 
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measured by various indicators of structural 
weaknesses. 
An important limitation of this analysis stems 
from the fact that the questions in the survey are 
specified in a general way (e.g. ‘do you think 
there is a need for significant structural reforms to 
improve the performance of the economy?’) and 
do not specifically address potentially sensitive 
areas (e.g. reforms of employment protection 
legislation). Therefore, the survey results need to 
be interpreted with considerable caution. There is 
a risk that support for specific reform proposals 
could diminish significantly if they entail some 
costs. Indeed, the survey results seem to confirm 
that financing of potentially costly reforms 
through cuts in public spending and particularly 
  
tax increases would not be supported by a 
majority of respondents in most euro-area 
countries. However, crises seem to have had an 
impact also in this respect. The acceptance of tax 
increases has risen in a number of countries. 
However, the willingness to accept public 
spending cuts has not changed significantly, 
probably reflecting the public’s preference for 
governments to continue to provide support for 
those affected by the crisis. Finally, the results 
also indicate that people think that reforms in 
other EU countries may induce their own 
government to introduce reforms and believe that 
the EU should play an active role in the domestic 
reform process. This appears to provide fairly 
strong support for the EU’s instrumental role in 
the process of coordinating economic reforms. 
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5. Structural reforms for knowledge-based 
economies: some insights from a DSGE 
model 
In its new EU 2020 strategy, the Commission has 
recently emphasised the critical role of knowledge 
as the engine for sustainable growth, calling for 
strengthened education and for more attractive 
framework conditions for innovation. Policies 
geared to sustaining potential growth also 
constitute an important part of the design of exit 
strategies.  
Against this background, there is a need to better 
understand the effect of specific policy 
instruments related to the knowledge economy on 
medium-term growth performance. This requires 
methods establishing a clear link between policy 
instruments, innovation, goods, labour and 
financial markets and macroeconomic aggregates. 
The present section therefore proposes to assess 
the effects of a number of knowledge-related 
structural reforms using a DSGE model fully 
equipped to take into account the relationships 
between innovation and growth.  
Modelling policy measures 
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
models are especially suitable for the analysis of 
the impact of structural reforms, as they 
incorporate microeconomic foundations, implying 
that the equations of the model are the outcome of 
the forward-looking, optimising decisions of 
individual economic agents. DSGE models also 
typically include imperfections in goods and 
labour markets. 
The model used for the simulations discussed 
below is a version of DG ECFIN’s QUEST III 
model, extended to include an endogenous growth 
mechanism. (31) The model is more detailed than 
standard DSGE models in order to be able to 
model the reforms as quantifiable policy 
measures, such as fiscal policy instruments and 
reductions in administrative costs. The production 
side of the economy consists of three sectors: a 
research sector, which produces patents, an 
intermediate sector, which produces intermediate 
goods on the basis of designs licensed by 
                                                        
(31) This version of the model has been applied to the analysis of 
the effects of structural reforms in the EU as a whole by 
Roeger, Varga and in ’t Veld (2008). See Roeger W., J. 
Varga and J. in ’t Veld (2008), ‘Structural Reforms in the 
EU: A simulation-based analysis using the QUEST model 
with endogenous growth’, European Economy, Economic 
Papers. December No 351. 
households (who buy them from the R&D sector), 
and a final goods sector. Moreover, the labour 
force is disaggregated into three skill groups with 
different efficiency levels: low-skilled, medium-
skilled and high-skilled workers. The model is 
calibrated for each of the euro-area Member 
States using country-specific structural 
information. 
Structural differences between Member States 
Euro-area Member States show important 
structural differences which imply that reforms 
will impact differently on the economies involved. 
Graph I.5.1 illustrates a broadly negative 
correlation between mark-ups in the final goods 
sector and the capital to output ratio across euro-
area countries. 
Graph I.5.1: Final goods sector mark-ups and 
capital to output ratios, euro-area  
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Source: EUKLEMS, Commission services’ calculations. 
There is also substantial empirical evidence of 
high entry barriers for start-ups in the euro area 
compared to other OECD countries, notably the 
US. Graph I.5.2 plots the relation between R&D 
intensity, defined as total R&D expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP, and entry barriers, measured 
as the cost of procedures and time borne by start-
ups before the firm can operate legally.  
Entry barriers vary widely across countries, 
ranging from 11 % of GDP per capita in Finland 
to 81 % of GDP per capita in Cyprus and Malta. 
Overall, it can be observed that catching-up 
Member States tend to be characterised by 
relatively low R&D intensities and high entry 
barriers, while the technology leaders such as 
Finland and Germany display opposite features. 
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Graph I.5.2: R&D intensity and entry barriers, 
euro-area Member States 
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Graphs I.5.1 and I.5.2 illustrate two important 
stylised facts: 
• Countries with high mark-ups tend to have 
lower capital to output ratios. 
• Entry barriers and R&D intensity are 
negatively correlated. 
Both facts are consistent with the predictions of 
the QUEST III model. In the presence of high 
mark-ups, demand for labour and physical capital 
is lower than in a more competitive environment. 
Since wages are more responsive to changes in 
demand than the rental rate of capital, high mark-
ups translate into a lower capital to output ratio. 
High entry barriers affect R&D investment 
negatively, as they imply high profit requirements 
for potential entrants who would engage in the 
production of new products. 
Member States also differ considerably in terms 
of the skill composition of the labour force. As 
shown in Graphs I.5.3, Malta and Portugal and, to 
a lesser extent, Spain and Italy have higher shares 
of low-skilled workers in the total labour force 
than other euro-area countries(32). There is, 
however, a smaller cross-country variation in the 
share of high-skilled workers, which ranges 
between 9.61 % in Finland and 1.87 % in Malta. 
                                                        
(32) High-skilled workers are defined as the segment of the labour 
force which can potentially be employed in the R&D sector, 
i.e. the share of the population with tertiary education 
qualifications in science, mathematics, computing or 
engineering programmes. Low-skilled workers are defined as 
the portion of the labour force with ISCED (International 
Standard Classification of Education) levels 0-2. The rest of 
the labour force is categorised as medium-skilled. 
Graph I.5.3: Population shares, euro area  
(share of total working population in %) (1) 
0
20
40
60
80
100
BE DE IE EL ES FR IT CY MT NL AT PT SI SK FI
Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled
(1) 2003-2007 averages. 
Source: Eurostat. 
The effects of structural reforms — Simulation 
results 
This section reports the effects of a set of 
structural reforms and describes how the impact 
of the measures is affected by the Member States’ 
starting conditions. Additional reform scenarios 
(and further details on the calibration of the 
model) are discussed in D’Auria, Pagano, Ratto 
and Varga (2009). (33) Table I.5.1 shows the effect 
on GDP of each of the policies 20 years after their 
adoption. A longer horizon (50 years) is 
considered for a measure aimed at improving 
human capital. 
Fiscal incentives to R&D. Much of the current 
policy debate focuses on various measures to 
increase knowledge investment and innovation in 
the EU. In this light, the first policy taken into 
consideration is a tax credit on R&D. Tax credits 
for R&D investment have become more popular 
as several EU Member States, notably Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, have 
switched from direct R&D funding towards fiscal 
incentives. 
The measure is modelled as a 10 pp tax credit on 
investment in intangible capital (i.e. R&D). By 
decreasing the rental rate of intangibles and thus 
increasing demand for patents, the tax credit 
stimulates R&D production and therefore boosts 
economic activity in all countries. The GDP effect 
of the tax credit ranges from 0.18 % in the case of  
                                                        
(33) D’Auria F., A. Pagano, M. Ratto and J. Varga (2009), ‘A 
comparison of structural reform scenarios across the EU 
Member States — Simulation-based analysis using the 
QUEST model with endogenous growth’, European 
Economy, Economic Papers. December No 392. European 
Commission. Brussels. 
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Ireland to 0.64 % for Cyprus. A multiple 
regression analysis (34) sheds some light on the 
factors behind the cross-country variations. A key 
role is played by the initial level of R&D 
intensity: countries where initial R&D spending is 
low benefit the most from the measure. Other 
important explanatory factors relate to the spill-
over effects from the stock of domestic and 
foreign knowledge and the relative efficiency of 
high-skilled workers within a country, as they 
determine the magnitude of the increase in the 
output of the research industry and hence of the 
overall economy. 
Product market reforms. Policies to ensure open 
and competitive markets and a dynamic business 
environment are also central to the EU 2020 
strategy. Table I.5.1 shows the effects of two 
product market reforms: an increase in 
competition in the final goods sector and a 
reduction in the administrative costs faced by 
start-ups. The first policy is modelled as a 1 pp 
reduction of the output price mark-up. Lower 
prices and stronger demand for sectoral output 
translate into increased demand for all production 
factors. In particular, the decrease in mark-ups 
boosts demand for physical capital, which in turn 
stimulates entry of new firms and R&D activity. 
The output effect ranges from 0.36 % in 
Luxembourg to 0.98 % in Greece. The regression 
analysis reveals that the cross-country differences 
are mostly driven by factors related to the role of 
tangible capital in the economy: high capital 
shares in production and a high level of 
                                                        
(34) The analysis is carried out by performing a stepwise linear 
regression for each scenario and time and by selecting the 
parameters or variables explaining most of the cross-country 
variations. 
investment are associated with bigger GDP 
effects. 
The second policy is simulated as a 10 % 
reduction in the administrative costs faced by 
start-ups. Administrative barriers act like a sunk 
cost for potential entrants. Therefore, reducing 
them makes projects which generate a lower 
present discounted value profitable, stimulating 
entry and the introduction of new products. After 
20 years, the policy increases GDP by between 
0.01 % in Finland and 0.64 % in Greece. The 
cross-country variations are partly explained by 
the fact that the simulated reduction in entry 
barriers is smaller for countries where the initial 
level of administrative costs is low (as in the case 
of Finland). However, in addition to this effect, 
the presence of high entry barriers keeps R&D 
investment low, implying a higher marginal 
product for intangible capital. Larger increases in 
GDP as a result of the policy are also experienced 
by Member States where knowledge production is 
highly efficient. 
Investment in human capital. As discussed 
earlier, there are large variations in the skill 
composition of the labour force between Member 
States. Moreover, compared to the US, Europe 
employs a relatively high share of low-skilled 
workers. There are therefore potentially high 
benefits to be reaped from policies aimed at 
improving workers’ skills. In the simulations 
reported in Table I.5.1, the improvement in 
human capital is modelled as a 1 % increase in the 
share of medium-skilled workers and a 
corresponding decrease in the share of low-skilled 
workers over a 40-year period.  
 
Table I.5.1: Effect of structural reforms on GDP, euro area 
(percentage deviation from baseline) 
Tax credit
(R&D) (1)
Belgium 0.30 0.57 0.08 0.35
Germany 0.27 0.73 0.04 0.38
Ireland 0.18 0.66 0.06 0.27
Greece 0.61 0.98 0.64 0.46
Spain 0.50 0.90 0.24 0.46
France 0.27 0.69 0.05 0.42
Italy 0.36 0.80 0.18 0.66
Cyprus 0.64 0.71 0.61 0.40
Luxembourg 0.22 0.36 0.06 0.09
Malta 0.55 0.60 0.49 0.62
Netherlands 0.21 0.62 0.06 0.34
Austria 0.27 0.77 0.06 0.52
Portugal 0.38 0.72 0.26 0.90
Slovenia 0.31 0.70 0.17 0.46
Slovakia 0.37 0.86 0.39 0.53
Finland 0.23 0.70 0.01 0.30
Increasing competition in the 
final goods sector (1) Reducing entry barriers (1) Improving human capital (2)
(1) Effect of the policy after 20 years; (2) Effect of the policy after 50 years. 
Source: D’Auria, Pagano, Ratto and Varga (2009). 
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The additional medium-skilled workers are more 
efficient than the replaced low-skilled workers, 
thereby boosting production. In addition, the 
increase in the share of medium-skilled workers 
lowers their wage premium with respect to other 
skill groups. After 50 years, the impact on GDP 
varies between 0.09 % in the case of Luxembourg 
and 0.9 % in the case of Portugal. Unsurprisingly, 
the countries which benefit the most from the 
improvement in the skill composition of the 
labour force are those in which the efficiency of 
medium-skilled workers relative to that of the 
other skill groups is higher. 
Conclusions 
This section analysed the macroeconomic impact 
on individual euro-area Member States of a series 
of structural reforms: policies aimed at 
stimulating research and innovation, product 
 
market reforms and improvements in human 
capital. According to our quantitative analysis, the 
policies discussed all have sizeable positive 
effects on GDP and employment.  
However, the effects of the measures vary widely 
across countries. Overall, the simulations 
highlight the importance of taking Member 
States’ initial conditions into account when 
devising structural reforms. Weak structural 
characteristics in terms of, among other things, 
low R&D intensity and capital to output ratios as 
well as high entry barriers are associated with 
higher returns from the adoption of the measures. 
Countries where knowledge investment and 
competition are currently low, as is the case for 
catching-up Member States, would therefore 
benefit the most from the adoption of structural 
reforms. 
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The global banking crisis has had a severe impact 
on the growth performance of the euro-area 
economy. Moreover, there is a broad consensus 
that resolution of problems in the banking sector 
is a precondition for a sustainable economic 
recovery. Extensive intervention by euro-area 
governments and the ECB in support of the 
banking sector has successfully prevented a 
financial meltdown. However, despite the severity 
of the crisis and the scale of public sector 
intervention, there is only limited evidence of 
structural change in the banking sector, fuelling 
popular perceptions that banks have returned to 
‘business as usual’ as the more acute phase of the 
crisis has passed. Against this background, this 
article focuses on longer-term trends in the euro-
area banking sector and how these trends are 
likely to be affected by the crisis.  
Forecasting the future for the euro-area banking 
sector in mid-crisis is inevitably a speculative 
exercise. Fundamental factors linked to 
technological progress and internationalisation 
will continue to influence the sector alongside 
factors linked to the crisis, such as the viability of 
business models and a tightening of the regulatory 
framework. At this stage, it is impossible to 
predict with certainty how these various factors 
will interact.  
For the purpose of this analysis, a set of indicators 
has been used to detect recent trends in the 
banking sector. However, it would be premature 
to assume that post-crisis changes can already be 
identified by reference to these indicators. Indeed, 
some pre-crisis trends have become evident in 
statistics only recently (e.g. securitisation) or are 
still not evident at all (e.g. the accumulation of 
toxic assets). A further important caveat relates to 
reliability of some of the indicators used, which 
  
were constructed from balance sheet data for 
about 100 euro-area banks retrieved from 
Bloomberg and the Orbis data bank. For many of 
the indicators, the set of observations was 
incomplete and the possibility of selection bias 
cannot be ruled out, i.e. data may not be available 
for those institutions for which they would be 
most telling. Also, the indicators typically reflect 
data for the full sample of banks and so may 
suffer from aggregation bias too.  
1. Concentration and integration  
Banks in the euro area had become fewer, 
larger and more international prior to the 
crisis 
The structure of the euro-area banking sector has 
undergone a gradual but steady change, in line 
with trends at the broader EU level. A significant 
decline in the number of banks is among the most 
eye-catching of trends (Graph II.1). Over the past 
10 years, about 30 % of euro-area banks have 
exited the market, most of them being acquired by 
or merged with other banks. In contrast to the 
decline in number of banks, the aggregate balance 
sheet for the sector has expanded markedly 
(Graph II.1). The increase in assets held by euro-
area banks has by far outpaced the contribution of 
the financial sector as a whole to economic 
growth. The total assets of euro-area banks grew 
by more than 100 % between 1998 and 2008, 
while the value added of the financial sector 
increased by 50 % in nominal terms over the same 
period. Employment in financial intermediation 
increased by 4 % over the period, well below the 
14 % increase for the economy as a whole, 
resulting in a decline in the financial sector’s 
share in total employment from 3 % to 2.75 %. 
A financial crisis puts banking structures under adjustment pressure, partly because banks are forced to 
respond to the crisis and partly because of regulatory changes made to prevent similar crises in the future. 
While the impact of the current crisis on the structure of the euro-area banking sector may not yet be visible in 
statistics, this section focuses on the possible directions which the banking sector could take by assessing 
whether pre-crisis trends are still compatible with the pressure for adjustment caused by the crisis. The 
analysis suggests that trends relating to size, concentration and integration are likely to continue as before the 
crisis. However, banks’ financing strategies are likely to shift towards having a stronger equity component, 
while their business models are likely to concentrate more on core markets. Overall, the euro-area financial 
system may ultimately be less dominated by banks relative to the activity of market financing and of other 
financial intermediaries. 
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Graph II.1: Change in the number and 
economic significance of banks, euro area 
(1998=100) (1) 
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(1) EA-12 for number of banks and assets, EA-16 for value added 
and employment. Number of banks adjusted for statistical change 
in IE. Value added and employment figures for broadly defined 
financial sector. 
Source: ECB, Commission services. 
The decline in the number of banks has been 
reflected in a notable increase in market 
concentration. The share of the (respectively) five 
largest banks in total assets increased from 42 % 
to 44 % for the average of all euro-area Member 
States. (35) In the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Finland this gauge of market concentration has 
reached a level of above 80 %.  
Many of the larger euro-area banks have been 
actively involved in mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A). While M&A activity in the banking 
sector slowly ebbed after 2006, the value of 
transactions nearly doubled in the period 2006-08 
relative to 2003-05, further suggesting that larger 
banks have become the main players in this 
activity. Accordingly, market concentration has 
also reflected strategic considerations most likely 
related to higher competitive pressure in an 
increasingly integrated banking market.  
Banking industry reports typically refer to 
efficiency in the form of scale and scope 
economies as the reason for the consolidation 
trend. (36) On the other hand, the crisis has 
reinforced concern among policy makers that the 
strategic factors driving consolidation among 
banks may include an assumption that size 
                                                        
(35) Average weighted with respective total size of bank assets in 
the country. 
(36) The dominance of fixed costs in many business areas gives 
room for scale economies. Hence, larger banks are more 
likely to benefit from cost regression through centralisation 
of certain activities, diversification advantages, or better 
accommodation of demand for large-scale transactions, for 
example with respect to financing customers’ M&A. 
increases the likelihood of receiving public 
support in times of crisis. This ‘too big to fail’ 
dimension will be further reviewed below.  
Cross-border consolidation among banks within 
the euro area has been fostered by the introduction 
of the euro and further progress in creating an 
internal market in financial services. (37) 
However, indicators of price dispersion for bank 
products reveal that the effect of market 
integration has been greater at the wholesale level, 
while retail banking markets have remained 
largely fragmented along national boundaries.  
Graph II.2: Market share of foreign banks, euro 
area (in % of total assets) (1) 
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(1) Assets of branches and subsidiaries of foreign credit 
institutions. 
Source: ECB. 
The share of banks owned by foreign credit 
institutions within the euro area has gradually 
increased over time, with cross-border M&A 
activity by banks accelerating in the period 2005-
08 (Graph II.2). It has been argued that this 
phenomenon reflects the fact that the optimal size 
of some banks, especially those based in smaller 
Member States, may be larger than possible on the 
domestic market and thus the expansion into 
foreign markets permits further exploitation of 
scale economies. (38) Such an explanation is 
consistent with the observation that market 
concentration generally tends to be higher the 
smaller the domestic market. 
                                                        
(37) For a review of recent trends, see the European 
Commission’s ‘European Financial Integration Report’ and 
the ECB’s ‘Financial Integration in Europe’, published 
annually on the institutions’ websites. 
(38) In a survey of 34 cross-border banking groups carried out by 
the ECB, most banks gave limited growth potential on home 
markets as a reason for their expansion into foreign markets. 
Higher growth potential and higher profit margins in the host 
countries were often quoted as important reasons, while 
economies of scale and diversification seem to have played a 
minor role in banks’ strategies. ECB (2008) EU Banking 
Structures 2008, pp. 11-12. 
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While the above-mentioned trends in the euro-
area banking sector are likely to persist, it is 
uncertain how they will be affected by the 
financial crisis and the subsequent policy 
responses. The following sections look into this 
question. 
The crisis appears not yet to have impacted on 
structural trends 
The financial crisis originated in the US and was 
transmitted to the euro area via wholesale 
financial markets. In consequence, it might be 
expected that bigger banks in the euro area would 
be relatively more exposed to the crisis, as they 
are generally more active on wholesale markets 
and may have a larger share of their activity 
linked to US markets. 
Graph II.3: Write-downs and bank size, euro 
area (1) 
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(1) Based on a sample of 39 euro-area banks for which 
Bloomberg reports data on write-downs (excluding one small 
German bank with very high losses). 
Source: Bloomberg, Commission services. 
Analysis of variables indicating exposure to the 
financial crisis and the size of banks (measured in 
total assets held in 2007) provides little support 
for the notion that big banks were more adversely 
affected than smaller ones. For example, the 
correlation of write-downs reported by 39 euro-
area banks in the period up to October 2008, i.e. 
when losses were mainly caused by exposure to 
US subprime markets and structured assets and 
before public capital was injected on a massive 
scale, and their size suggests that there could even 
be an inverse relationship (Graph II.3). It should, 
however, be noted that the likelihood of such an 
inverse relationship declines if write-downs until 
summer 2009 are included. 
Similar exercises relating banks’ size to (i) the 
decline in stock prices up to the peak of the 
financial crisis, (ii) CDS spreads or (iii) the 
change in CDS spreads, as measures of markets’ 
perceptions of default risk are equally 
inconclusive. (39) However, it should be noted that 
these financial indicators may already price in a 
premium that some banks were too-big-to-fail, 
which would distort the information content of 
these indicators in a cross-bank perspective. 
Moreover, there might be a selection bias towards 
bigger banks due to data availability, with smaller 
banks used in the sample analysed not being small 
in comparison to the whole population of banks in 
the euro area.  
Graph II.4: Change in the banking systems’ 
capital and market concentration, euro-area 
Member States 
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Source: ECB, Commission services. 
If the financial crisis affected bigger banks more 
strongly than smaller banks, one would expect 
that more concentrated banking systems were hit 
harder. At the country level, there is indeed a 
weak (by no means statistically significant) 
inverse relationship between market concentration 
and the decline in the banking system’s aggregate 
capital position. (40) On the one hand, several 
large banks in Belgium and the Netherlands, 
where banking markets are the most concentrated 
in the euro area, were prominent victims of the 
financial crisis. On the other hand, few problems 
were reported with respect to Finnish banks, 
which operate on a similarly concentrated home 
market, although their capital-to-asset ratio fell by 
a comparable magnitude. Although the German 
banking market is the least concentrated at the 
national level and the aggregate capital of the 
                                                        
(39) At this level of aggregation, i.e. with 42 observations for 
stock prices and 28 CDS prices, there are no evident signs 
that larger banks faced a higher default risk or a stronger 
increase in their default risk at the peak of the financial crisis. 
(40) Capital is a proxy of banks’ equity position. The data is from 
the ECB’s aggregate balance sheets, which differs from 
consolidated data, since it is not adjusted for cross-bank 
ownership relationships. 
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German banking system was hardly eroded during 
the acute phase of the crisis, several German 
banks have required direct intervention by the 
State.   
It is similarly unclear whether cross-border banks 
have been more adversely affected by the crisis 
than domestically oriented banks. However, there 
is evidence that the euro-area banking market has 
become more fragmented during the crisis. For 
example, the cross-country difference between 
retail interest rates, which is a standard measure of 
financial market integration, widened 
considerably. Even on money markets, which had 
been considered the markets where integration 
was most advanced, evidence suggests that traders 
preferred to undertake transactions with domestic 
banks. This more anecdotal evidence is supported 
by trends in interbank deposit growth, where 
domestic transactions were in most countries the 
only positive contributors to interbank deposit 
growth in Q4/2008 while deposits from other 
euro-area countries or from banks located outside 
the euro area were substantially trimmed down 
(Graph II.5).  
Graph II.5: Origin of intra-bank deposit 
growth, euro area  
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Source: ECB. 
On the basis of these observations, there is no 
prima facie reason why the effects of the crisis on 
the euro-area banking sector should lead to less 
consolidation or less cross-border activity. 
However, it is possible that reasons for such a 
change in strategy could emerge from the policy 
response to the crisis.  
Restructuring of banks after the crisis may 
have longer-term effects  
The policy response to the financial crisis may 
impact on the concentration and integration of the 
banking sector via two opposing channels. First, 
although state aid measures to banks had the 
objective of rescuing the banking system rather 
than individual banks, they may eventually be 
biased in favour of large banks on the assumption 
that these may be ‘too big to fail’. Such 
experience could provide an incentive for banks to 
grow in size so as to benefit from implicit 
government support. Conversely, the enormous 
budgetary outlay required in response to the crisis 
has highlighted the possibility that some banks 
risk being ‘too big to rescue’. In consequence, 
policy makers have a strong incentive to design 
financial regulation in such a way that it 
discourages the expansion of already large 
financial institutions. 
In light of the Lehman bankruptcy, bank rescue 
measures were designed to safeguard financial 
stability by preventing the failure of systemically 
important banks. A bank’s size is only one among 
several determinants of systemic relevance. 
Interconnectedness (i.e. cross-exposures between 
institutions) and substitutability (i.e. whether other 
market participants can provide the same services 
at short notice) are also factors determining 
systemic importance, as reflected in the fact that 
many smaller banks have received state aid in the 
current crisis. Nevertheless, interconnectedness 
and substitutability tend to be correlated with size, 
implying that bigger banks are more likely to be 
systemic and therefore also more likely to benefit 
from state aid than smaller ones. Using a panel of 
88 euro-area banks, it can be shown that the 
average size of banks which received state aid 
was indeed somewhat higher than the average 
bank size in the panel. (41) (See first two columns 
in Graph II.6.) However, the variation in banks’ 
size in both groups is so large that the difference 
in the mean is not statistically significant. 
Numerous banks which have received state aid are 
now required by EU state aid rules to restructure. 
It may be that these banks are bigger than those 
that received state aid without such conditionality 
attached. (See column 3 in Graph II.6.) Again, the 
difference is slight and not statistically significant; 
furthermore the result may be time-dependent, as 
more banks may be required to restructure as the 
crisis is resolved. The obligation to restructure 
generally results from the Commission’s state aid 
rules. Where financial institutions received state 
aid, Member States need to submit a viability plan 
or restructuring plan in order to confirm or re-
                                                        
(41) The result is not caused by the availability of bank schemes 
in countries with bigger banks. 
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establish the institute’s viability in the longer term 
without reliance on state aid. (42)  
Graph II.6: Average size of banks having used 
state aid (total assets, 2007, EUR billion) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Restructuring often results in the obligation to 
divest, i.e. to shrink the balance sheet, either to 
run down unprofitable business lines in order to 
restore long-term viability, or to divest in order to 
contribute to restructuring and to address 
competition distortions caused by aid. (43) Since 
the requirement to restructure has been imposed 
on banks which are on average larger than the 
bank average, this requirement may compensate 
for the fact that the larger banks — on average — 
benefited from state aid during the crisis. As such, 
the restructuring obligation may also act as a 
counterweight to incentives for banks to achieve 
‘too big to fail’ status. 
Design of future cross-border supervision and 
crisis management will shape the prospects for 
banking integration  
The concentration and integration of the banking 
sector may be more directly affected by policy 
measures to limit the stability risk associated with 
systemically important institutions. Proposals in 
this regard are under active consideration within 
                                                        
(42) The Commission laid down conditions under which a bank 
may need to be subject to more substantial restructuring and 
when measures are needed to compensate for distortions in 
competition resulting from the state aid. These conditions 
depend broadly speaking on the seriousness of the problem in 
each individual bank and cover inter alia the magnitude of the 
state aid relative to a bank’s risk-weighted assets. 
(43) In practice, banks are not required to divest immediately as 
the EC state aid procedures allow banks to spread 
divestments over several years, so as to avoid putting 
additional downward pressure on prices.  
the G20 framework. Research has begun into how 
systemic relevance can be accurately measured, 
considering that size alone would probably be an 
insufficient criterion. While there is a broad 
consensus within the G20 on the principle of 
limiting the risks associated with systemically 
important institutions, there seems less agreement 
on the more specific details of any policy 
approach.  
Changed incentives for banks to grow may also 
have a bearing on the trend towards financial 
integration in the euro area. In the crisis, the 
advantages for cross-border banks in having 
centralised capital and liquidity management were 
limited by opposing interests among authorities in 
home and host countries.  
Policy coordination has been directed at reducing 
tensions from potentially opposing interests 
among home and host authorities in cross-border 
crisis management. In effect, this has meant 
ensuring that public funds provided by home 
countries to the parent bank have benefited the 
banking group as a whole. Meanwhile, the ring-
fencing of liquidity and assets in the foreign 
subsidiaries of the banking group has been 
discouraged. The coordination effort has also 
included commitments by cross-border banks to 
maintain their exposure in host countries and be 
prepared to provide additional capital to their 
affiliates if this is deemed necessary.  
In the future, policy coordination along these lines 
should be facilitated by the establishment of the 
European System of Financial Supervisors, which 
will include a European Banking Authority. This 
new architecture will be particularly relevant for 
international banks as they provide inter alia a 
mechanism for ensuring that supervisory colleges 
are consistent for each cross-border group. In 
addition, regulatory proposals to improve cross-
border crisis management and resolution are 
under active discussion. Important issues in this 
regard are the availability and consistency of early 
intervention tools for supervisors and consistency 
in the framework for reorganisation and winding 
up of ailing banks.  
2. Capital, leverage and financing  
The financial crisis exposed banks’ vulnerability 
to a high debt-equity position amid losses that 
eroded banks’ capital positions and in some cases 
brought capital-asset ratios close to regulatory 
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minima. (44) Severely hit by the associated drying-
out of debt markets were those institutions that 
had a large share of their liabilities financed from 
short-term funding.  
Banks increased their risk exposure prior to 
the financial crisis 
The available aggregate balance sheet data for the 
euro-area banking system suggests that there was 
no dramatic increase in leverage prior to the 
financial crisis. The ratio of bank capital to total 
assets, which measures the share of the balance 
sheet not financed via debt, started a gentle 
downward trend in late 2002. Up to October 2008, 
it declined by about 1 percentage point to 6.4 % 
when measured with consolidated data and by 0.6 
percentage point to 5.3 % with non-consolidated 
data (Graph II.7). (45) This trend decline basically 
undid the increase recorded between 1999 and 
2002. (46) 
Graph II.7: Aggregate capital ratios, euro area 
banking system (bank capital in % of assets) 
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Source: ECB. 
Regulators attach more importance to alternative 
forms of capital ratios than to the ratio of total 
capital to total assets. The capital adequacy ratio 
relates banks’ capital to their risk-weighted assets 
and the Basel rules oblige banks to hold a 
minimum of 8 %. Graph II.8 shows the average 
                                                        
(44) Bank capital is understood here as the equity position of a 
bank. In a strict sense, this would be the part of the bank’s 
balance sheet that is financed from shareholders, in contrast 
to the remaining part financed via debt. A number of hybrid 
instruments also count as capital in regulatory practice and 
the discussion is still ongoing on whether and how the 
definition of bank capital should be improved. 
(45) In consolidated data, inter-bank relationships, i.e. banks’ 
holdings of other banks’ capital and debt, are netted out. 
(46) However, the use of off-balance sheet operations by euro-
area banks rose significantly prior to the crisis. Therefore, 
banks’ aggregate balance sheets might not fully capture the 
change in aggregate exposure of banks particularly over that 
period. 
capital adequacy ratio for a set of 32 euro-area 
banks, which were selected because of data 
availability.  
Graph II.8: Capital adequacy ratio, euro area 
(bank capital in % of risk-weighted assets,  
year-end values) (1) 
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Eurostoxx banks. Missing observations for individual banks were 
interpolated. 
Source: Commission services. 
Consistent with the aggregate data in Graph II.7, a 
decline in the ratio is visible. It set in earlier and 
was more pronounced for the average of the 
biggest banks in the panel (average of banks in 
Eurostoxx 50). The relationship between the 
decline in the capital adequacy ratio and bank size 
is, however, not uniform. For example, the 
average capital adequacy ratio of the 15 banks 
that are part of the Euribor panel (47) declined by 
less than the average of all of the 32 banks for 
which data was available. It can also be noted that 
the average data shown in Graph II.8 hides an 
increasing dispersion of banks’ ratios over time. 
During the financial crisis, some banks saw their 
capital ratios approaching regulatory minima. 
Although the financial crisis was propagated by 
severe liquidity shortages in several banks, there 
is no evident increase over time of the euro-area 
banking system’s exposure to short-term debt 
financing on the basis of aggregate and averaged 
data. For example, the loan-deposit ratio, which 
has in the absence of more accurate measures 
become a standard gauge for banks’ liquidity risk 
at the macro level, shifted downwards from 2002 
on in the euro area. Balance sheet data suggest 
that the share of short-term borrowing in total 
                                                        
(47) Overall 40 banks, of which 34 are located in the euro area, 
belong to the Euribor panel, which is used to calculate 
Euribor interest rates. They are on average smaller in size 
than the 9 banks that are part of the Eurostoxx and include 
some banks that are not quoted on stock markets. 
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assets — a further broad indicator of exposure to 
liquidity risk — also retreated over the last years 
for a sample of 48 and since 2004 for the sample 
of 13 of the bigger euro-area banks. This indicates 
that maturity mismatch between the often long-
term loans and deposits, of which a large part is 
redeemable at short-term notice, has not 
increased. 
Graph II.9: Liquidity exposure, euro area (1) 
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(1) Unweighted averages of banks for which data was available 
for the whole time period. Missing observations for individual 
banks were interpolated. Loan-deposit ratio excluding intra-bank 
loans/deposits for euro-area aggregate. 
Source: ECB, Commission services. 
Will banks increase their capital buffers in 
response to the financial crisis? 
During the financial crisis, banks’ capital 
positions came under pressure from two sides. 
First, substantial amounts of losses and write-
downs eroded banks’ capital, bringing them closer 
to regulatory minima. Second, investors raised 
their demand on banks’ capital position. A high 
capital position and a good endowment with ‘high 
quality’ capital were interpreted as signs of 
solvency. Banks’ ability to raise new capital from 
private investors became an important signal of 
their soundness. 
In the acute phase of the crisis, however, few 
banks were able to raise equity or issue long-term 
debt from private sources. Governments stepped 
in with public capital. Euro-area governments 
made available capital injections totalling EUR 
240 billion or 2.7 % of GDP, of which EUR 156 
billion or 1.7 % of GDP has so far effectively been 
used. Especially in autumn/winter 2008, public 
capital injections were the main driver of banks’ 
recapitalisation and are the main reason behind 
the pick-up in capital adequacy ratios at year-end 
2008, as shown in Graphs II.7 and II.8. Since 
then, several banks have been able to tap private 
capital markets and the first ones started to 
redeem governments’ capital injections. The most 
important source of capital increases has in the 
meantime become banks’ profits. The economic 
rebound, revenues from fees generated on 
recovering debt markets, trading income and in 
particular the steep yield curve boosted banks’ 
profitability and contributed to the recapitalisation 
of banks. 
Graph II.10: Initial capital adequacy ratio and 
change in 2007-08, euro area  
(capital in % of risk-weighted assets) (1) 
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(1) 57 euro-area banks. 
Source: Commission services. 
Is this trend sustainable in the longer term? Low 
policy rates have led to a favourably sloped yield 
curve and it is clear that banks’ profits would be 
considerably lower with a more normal term 
premium. Accordingly, banks’ balance sheets may 
be vulnerable to a future flattening in the yield 
curve, perhaps linked to higher short-term interest 
rates as the economic recovery proceeds. 
Furthermore, it is unclear for how long 
shareholders will accept bank earnings being 
retained to increase capital buffers rather than 
distributed as dividends. These factors may not 
endure in the longer term, with implications for 
targeted leverage levels and financing maturities 
of banks. 
While higher capital ratios are likely to provide 
banks with higher buffers in times of emergency, 
there is so far no strong empirical evidence that 
banks with an initially low capital ratio were more 
severely exposed to the crisis. The observations in 
Graph II.10 suggest that the highest decline in 
capital ratios occurred in banks that entered the 
financial crisis with a relatively high ratio, 
whereas many banks with a low ratio were able to 
boost their capital. (48) An inverse relationship 
also appears – with a partly overlapping set of 
                                                        
(48) This effect could also be caused by the holding of higher 
initial capital buffers by banks with a higher risk profile. 
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banks – if these variables are plotted with 
quarterly observations in the period up to the third 
quarter 2008, i.e. before governments started to 
massively inject public capital. Neither is there 
any obvious sign that banks with a lower capital 
ratio experienced higher write-downs (relative to 
their assets). Equally, there is no apparent 
relationship between the share of short-term 
borrowing and write-downs. (49) Nevertheless, 
these observations put into question whether the 
banking sector in general will durably target 
higher capital or liquidity buffers. 
A factor that may incentivise banks to hold less 
capital in the future could be the experience of 
receiving public support in case of need. Although 
the financial crisis has been a truly exceptional 
event, the emergency policy responses may have 
generated moral hazard among the 
beneficiaries. (50) Graph II.11 indeed suggests that 
pre-crisis capital ratios were slightly lower on 
average for banks that used state aid compared to 
those that did not. The variation around the mean 
is, however, too large to be statistically 
significant. 
Graph II.11: Capital adequacy ratios of banks 
subject to different forms of public intervention, 
euro area (2007 ratios) (1) 
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(1) Unweighted average and standard deviation of 61 euro-area 
banks. 
Source: Commission services. 
Since balance sheet indicators may not fully 
reveal banks’ vulnerabilities, additional insights 
can be derived from prices of credit default swaps 
(CDS), which express the market sentiment on 
banks’ default risk. Since CDS spreads are 
                                                        
(49) Beyond this lack of evidence at the aggregate level, it was 
obvious that some individual banks faced severe difficulties 
stemming from their reliance on short-term funding. 
(50) This effect may be reinforced by the objective of public 
rescue schemes to support the banking system rather than 
ailing banks because this trigger implies that it has not 
necessarily paid off for a bank to hold a higher capital buffer. 
available only for larger banks, the panel used in 
Graph II.12 was expanded to include also non-
euro area and two Swiss banks.  
Graph II.12: Banks’ CDS spreads differentiated 
by rating and use of state aid  
(5-year senior debt, basis points) (1) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Comparing the development of CDS spreads of 
banks that used state aid (dotted lines) with those 
that did not (straight lines) yields interesting 
observations on the effectiveness of public 
support measures (see also Box II.1 for 
quantitative evidence):  
• In the period up to September 2008, CDS 
spreads became increasingly higher for those 
banks that later used public support. This 
supports the hypothesis that the public support 
was effectively targeted at banks that needed it 
most. Or, the other way round, banks that did 
without state aid were in a more comfortable 
position and could afford to abstain, at least in 
relative terms. 
• From October 2008 to February 2009, 
supported banks with an A rating had a lower 
CDS spread than the non-supported banks. 
This suggests that the public support 
effectively reduced their default risk. The 
advantage of state support is also visible for 
the AA-rated CDS, but only in relative terms 
as CDS spreads of supported banks remained 
slightly higher than those of non-supported 
banks. The wedge, however, narrowed in the 
period October to December 2008. 
• Since March 2009 the CDS spreads of non-
supported banks improved more pronouncedly 
than that of the supported banks. This could be 
indicative of these banks now capitalising on  
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Box II.1: The effectiveness of banking support measures: evidence from CDS spreads
This box provides empirical support for the hypothesis that banks’ default risk as measured by CDS spreads 
declined after bank rescue schemes had been implemented. This is an encouraging sign since policy makers have 
been under considerable pressure to justify the large amounts of public money spent on bank rescue measures. 
Recent studies by BIS and IMF researchers have shown that CDS spreads fell in the days around the announcement 
of public support measures. (1)  
The estimates in this box reinforce their findings by using a different empirical methodology. Whereas the IMF and 
BIS event studies focus on short-term effects by using daily observations, this box employs a longer-term 
perspective that covers the period from October 2007 to August 2009 with monthly observations of the CDS spreads 
of 35 European banks. This approach is likely to identify effects beyond the short time windows used in the event 
studies. The period was chosen to obtain a balanced panel of banks for the longest time span possible. It has the 
advantage that the time period encompasses the Bear Stearns episode in March 2008, i.e. a crisis event that 
happened before public rescue schemes were announced. For the time after the announcement of policy support 
measures in October 2008, it includes banks that received government support and some that did not.  
The estimated model includes cross-bank and time-fixed effects, which control for factors that are specific to the 
individual bank, but do not change over time, and for factors that are common to all banks in each period, 
respectively. For bank i at time t, we have the following semi-log formulation:  
 ln(CDSt, x) = C + FEt + FEi + α1*ln(CDSt-1, i) + α2*Zt, i  + ε t, i   
with C = constant, FE = fixed effects (dummies), Z a vector of the policy variable and εt,x. the error term. 
Estimation results with fixed time and cross-section constants,  
Dependent variable: LN(CDS), significant results at 5 % level shown in bold,  
period starting November 2007, 35 banks 
 T1  
11/2007-12/2008 
T2  
11/2007-03/2009 
T3 
11/2007-08/2009 
 α2 s.e  α2 s.e α2 s.e 
Country-specific variables 
Programme – dummy (lag 1) PRGM 0.0364 0.03269 0.01295 0.0247 0.0079 0.0190 
Recapitalisation with lag 1 
– dummy RECAP -0.0404 0.0374 -0.0310 0.0231 -0.0132 0.0169 
– announced measure in EUR RECAP_EUR -0.0009 0.0005 -0.0014 0.0003 -0.0006 0.0002 
– in % of GDP RECAP_GDP -0.0094 0.0041 -0.0046 0.0029 -0.0030 0.0022 
– in % of country’s bank assets RECAP_AS -0.0037 0.0015 -0.0029 0.0011 -0.0022 0.0009 
Guarantee on liabilities – 
dummy DEBT -0.0232 0.0279 -0.0168 0.0224 -0.0003 0.0173 
Bank-specific policy variables 
Aid to bank – dummy AID_TO_BANK -0.0964 0.0223 -0.0629 0.0211 -0.0184 0.0166 
Recapitalisation in EUR BANKRECAP -0.0122 0.0030 -0.0064 0.0017 -0.0014 0.0012 
Recapitalisation in % of bank’s 
assets BANKRECAP_AS -0.1269 0.0303 -0.0311 0.0141 0.0126 0.0088 
Issuance of state-guaranteed 
securities – dummy SEC_I -0.0492 0.0494 0.0253 0.0253 0.0350 0.0174 
Note: α2 relates to the coefficient in formula (1), s.e. is the standard error.  
 
Various policy variables were constructed at the bank and the country level. Country-specific policy 
variables relate to the existence and size of public rescue programmes. Bank-specific policy variables 
cover whether and to what extent banks made use of these programmes. Since the banks’ CDS spreads 
are highly auto-correlated, it appeared necessary to add a lagged dependent variable to the set of 
                                                           
(1) Panetta, F. et al. (2009), ‘An assessment of financial sector rescue packages’, BIS paper No 48; IMF (2009), ‘Global Financial 
Stability Report’, October 2009; Ait-Sahalia, Y. et al. (2009), ‘How to stop a herd of running bears? Market response to policy 
initiatives during the global financial crisis’, IMF Working Paper 09/24.  
(Continued on the next page)
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their own strategy in order to steer through the 
crisis without public support. 
Towards new regulation on capital and 
liquidity 
In view of the financial crisis, a consensus has 
emerged among policy makers that capital 
requirements will need to be tightened. For 
instance, in Pittsburgh in September 2009, the 
G20 committed inter alia to ‘developing by end-
2010 internationally agreed rules to improve both 
the quantity and quality of bank capital and to 
discourage excessive leverage’. The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision has initiated a 
work programme to strengthen the regulatory 
capital framework. In view of the need to embed 
new standards into law, the EU adopted changes 
to the Capital Requirements Directive whereas 
further Commission proposals on this Directive 
Box (continued) 
explanatory variables. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable has the undesired consequence of reducing the 
probability that a significant coefficient for the policy variable can be detected. The reason is that the policy 
variables used involve a one-time shift and over time part of the impact will be reflected in the lagged variable. 
Since the share of the impact that becomes visible in the lagged variable increases over time, one would expect the 
policy variable to become insignificant the longer the policy is enacted. Because of this effect, the estimates are run 
with a varying time frame. In addition to the full period November 2007 to August 2009, shorter samples were 
estimated with the period ending in (T1) December 2008 and (T2) March 2009. 
When looking at the results for the individual variables, one first finds that the existence of a public rescue scheme 
is not significantly correlated with CDS spreads. Policy variables related to recapitalisation have more often the 
expected negative sign and are significant. A further observation relates to the different formulations of the 
recapitalisation variable. When specified as a dummy, coefficients were hardly significant. However, the estimations 
often yielded a significant coefficient if the policy variable was defined in terms of the size of the measure. This 
suggests that the more sizeable the recapitalisation measure, the more likely it reduced the CDS spread. 
Impact on CDS with estimates for T1 
(relative to baseline in %) 
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The estimates show that most of the effect of a policy 
measure on CDS spreads has materialised after 6 months. 
The graph plots how CDS prices have developed in 
response to the policy measure undertaken, using the 
average change in the policy variable since October 2008 
as the impulse. The response is stronger for policy 
variables that target the bank than for country-specific 
variables. This would suggest that the establishment of a 
recapitalisation scheme has a smaller effect than the fact 
that an individual bank makes use of the scheme. 
Concerning the immediate impact, it varied between 4 % 
and 10 % in the first month after the policy measure. The 
parameters suggest that most of the adjustment takes place 
in the first 6 months and that after a year CDS spreads 
would be between 90 % and 70 % of their starting level.  Source: Commission services. 
The finding of a significantly negative relationship between CDS spread and various measures of policy activity is 
robust to a number of changes to the specification of the estimate. For this exercise, various specifications were run 
with or without fixed effects and by adding further potential explanatory variables such as confidence indicators, 
ratings, mergers, other CDS prices. The addition of other variables has little impact on the significance of the policy 
variable. In only a few estimates did the policy variable became insignificant and these were all estimates with no 
control for either time-fixed effects or the cross-over variable. It could mean that policy interventions do not have an 
effect on the bank’s absolute CDS spread, but only on the CDS spread relative to the market benchmark. In turn this 
would imply that the policy measures had little effect on the overall level of CDS spreads in the banking system. 
Although the estimates suggest that there is an inverse correlation between on the one hand the existence and 
generosity of public rescue schemes and on the other hand the CDS spread as a market assessment of the banks’ 
default risk, the empirical tool does not allow the direction of causality to be stated. There are reasons to believe that 
the result was not driven by selection bias as Graph 14 in the main text suggests that banks using state aid had a 
higher rather than a lower CDS spread prior to the crisis. However, it appears important to continue monitoring this 
issue and to look for alternative methodologies that could further underpin the results found in this box. 
 
 
II. Trends in European banking 
 
- 49 -
are currently under discussion in the Council and 
additional proposals are planned for 2010. 
The dominant course of possible changes has 
given less attention to imposing across-the-board 
higher capital ratios, and more to adjusting several 
of their parameters. Under discussion are 
numerous proposals covering: 
• the definition of eligible capital (when is a 
liability sufficiently loss-taking to count as 
capital),  
• the risk-weighting of banks’ assets (the 
valuation of assets: mark-to-market versus to 
mark-to-models versus historical costs),  
• the build-up of reserves in ‘good times’ 
(provisioning to reduce pro-cyclicality and 
other risks), 
• the role of stress tests (second pillar) and 
information disclosure requirements (third 
pillar).  
A fair assumption is that under modified capital 
requirement rules banks will have to hold higher 
capital buffers and capital with higher loss 
absorption capacity. But given their need to 
restore their capital basis even under current rules, 
there is likely to be an adequately long transition 
period.  
The supervision of banks’ liquidity is also under 
discussion. The 2008 modifications to the Capital 
Requirements Directive introduced some 
qualitative standards for good management of 
liquidity and the Basel Committee announced that 
it would put in place a global standard for 
liquidity requirements. Such standards could form 
the basis for quantitative ratios in future European 
legislation.  
3. Changes to banks’ business models 
The global financial crisis will have a lasting 
impact on euro-area banks, and will bring about 
significant changes to banks’ operating 
framework and their business models. This 
transformation is influenced by shifting 
preferences of investors and a changing 
macroeconomic environment. Regulation will also 
expand as governments seek to establish rules that 
will make the financial system more resilient and 
less prone to cause future crises. Banks will have 
to adapt their business models to this new 
situation, and the question is what the future of 
banking will look like. In this sub-section, 
answering this question involves identifying past 
trends in bank income and analysing the impact of 
the crisis on these trends in bank funding, as well 
as discussing the future source for growth. 
Trend towards non-interest income in bank 
revenues 
The importance of net non-interest income as a 
source of bank revenues increased during the 
period building up to the financial crisis. The 
change has been slow but persistent. During the 
three years prior to the beginning of the financial 
crisis in 2007, net interest income declined from a 
share of 52 % of total income to about 47 % 
(Graph II.13). Conversely, revenues from non-
interest paying sources have become more 
important for banks’ profitability. The main 
contributions to non-interest business are trading 
income and fees and commissions, which have 
served as a means to diversify overall income. 
Graph II.13: Net interest and net non-interest 
income, euro area  
(in % of total operating income) 
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Source: ECB, Commission services. 
During the crisis years, the general trend of 
shifting from interest income to non-interest 
income has been reversed. First, the gradually 
increasing importance of trading income came to 
an abrupt end with the onset of the crisis, and in 
2008 trading income even turned into a net loss. 
Second, net interest income has been boosted by a 
loosening of the monetary stance in response to 
the financial crisis. Lower policy interest rates 
have made the yield curve steeper, which has 
allowed banks to increase their margins between 
short-term funding and long-term lending. 
Furthermore, banks tend to benefit from falling 
interest rates as the pass-through of lower interest 
rates to customers is not immediate. Overall, this 
has allowed most banks to remain profitable 
throughout the crisis. 
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The funding of banks’ business models has 
shifted from retail deposits to market-based 
funding 
The importance of deposits as a source of bank 
funding has been trending downward for many 
years. During the ten years preceding the current 
crisis, deposit liabilities dropped from 58 % of 
total liabilities to 51 % (Graph II.14). The 
traditional funding model, relying on retail 
deposits, has slowly shifted towards a funding 
model that is more market-based. Examples of 
such funding instruments include mortgage-
backed securities, collateralised debt obligations 
and other forms of securitised products, which 
have made the banking sector more dependent on 
wholesale capital markets. Although these 
developments have enabled banks to achieve 
higher returns on equity than otherwise possible, 
replacing the more stable retail deposits with 
wholesale funding may have made banks more 
vulnerable and exposed to market conditions and 
perceptions. 
Graph II.14: Deposits liabilities, euro area 
(in % of total assets) 
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Source: ECB, Commission services. 
Securitisation activity — i.e. the transformation of 
loans into tradable securities — increased 
substantially in the years prior to the crisis. It even 
continued at a healthy pace in the midst of the 
crisis in 2008. The investment vehicles 
surrounding securitisation facilitated the changes 
in the financial structure of banks, and changed 
their business models from holding assets and 
transforming them in terms of denomination and 
maturity, to repackaging and selling complex 
financial products. The increased complexity of 
securitised products made it difficult to price them 
and asses their risks. As a result, investors were 
not fully aware of the underlying risks, and the 
mispricing that followed eventually led to rising 
uncertainty, and the outbreak of the crisis. In the 
last year, the volume of securitised issuance 
seems to have fallen dramatically, on the back of 
the high uncertainty regarding the quality and the 
underlying risks embedded in securitised 
products. 
Currently banks are actively trying to secure their 
retail deposit basis as a response to weaker 
wholesale markets. For some banks it is even a 
necessity as often one of the conditions in the 
restructuring plans imposed in order to receive 
state aid is for the bank to maintain a sound 
deposit-to-loan ratio. In general, however, the 
deposit-to-loan ratio has been relatively stable 
over time, implying that securitisation has been a 
means of increasing leverage through off-balance 
sheet activity. 
Graph II.15: Volume of securitisation issuance in 
Europe (EUR billion) (1) 
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(1) The figure for 2009 only includes data for the first half of 
2009. The issuance volume is annualised by assuming the same 
issuance volume for the second half of the year. 
Source: European Securitisation Forum. 
Possible changes to banks’ income sources 
The near-term outlook for the profitability of 
euro-area banks is rather difficult. Several of the 
forces behind past income growth in the banking 
sector have come to an end, such as structurally 
declining interest rates, rapid lending growth, and 
low credit losses. There may well be very little 
support for growth in the banking sector for some 
time: 
• Net interest income is likely to be hurt by 
lower lending growth as demand fades with a 
weak real economy. Households will have to 
save more to bring debt levels into line with 
disposable income, which can also lead to 
lower spending for quite some time. 
Furthermore, a normalisation of the yield 
curve, i.e. a rise of short-tem rates relative to 
these for longer maturities, is likely. 
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• Trading income, which was a driver of net 
income growth, is not likely to continue that 
role to the same extent. Banks seem to have 
cut back on resources devoted to trading, 
which reduces the base for generating 
revenues. Furthermore, the change in 
ownership structure, with higher government 
involvement, and increased supervision might 
affect banks’ risk profiles, shifting them 
towards less involvement in capital market 
activities. 
• Fees and commissions are likely to remain 
under pressure. As the crisis has evolved and 
assets managed by banks have declined in 
value, confidence in the banking sector has 
been severely hurt. As a consequence, and also 
in line with general market developments, 
customers seem to have withdrawn from 
complex investment strategies and shifted their 
assets to more simple, standardised, and liquid 
products. These products usually face higher 
competition and exhibit lower margins. 
What are the prospects for cross-border 
banking in the euro area? 
Although any assessment of the impact of the 
financial crisis on the profitability of cross-border 
banking is speculative, it is likely that domestic 
markets will become more important as a result of 
the deleveraging process and government 
measures to stabilise markets. In order to become 
viable, banks are probably focusing on their core 
markets, which are most often domestic. In these 
markets they have their stable core client base, 
better knowledge and a good relationship with 
policy makers. Finally, public support measures 
are national, which may provide incentives for 
banks to concentrate on their home market. 
Over the medium term, financial integration in the 
EU, and beyond, is likely to proceed as the 
underlying economic driving forces behind this 
trend remain intact: diversification is in general 
beneficial for reducing overall risk, and as such 
support financial stability even in a synchronised 
downturn like the present one. In an international 
setting, banks can balance their earnings from 
stable mature markets with those from emerging, 
often more dynamic, markets. Given that 
valuations are still low, those banks that stand 
strong after the crisis might also face 
opportunities to strengthen their growth potential 
through mergers and acquisitions abroad, also in 
view of the fact that divestments from banks 
subject to restructuring under state aid rules will 
be offered to the market. Restructuring could even 
strengthen the integration of banking markets as 
cross-border banking groups may try to penetrate 
new markets by acquiring divested entities in 
target markets. Also, the removal of obstacles 
continues to feature prominently on the EU policy 
agenda.  
4. Conclusions  
The financial crisis has put pressure on the 
banking sector to restructure, partly because banks 
face new market conditions, but also due to 
regulatory reform and as a consequence, under the 
EU state aid rules, of the receipt of large amounts 
of state aid. This focus section reviews past trends 
in the banking system and contemplates in which 
direction the banking sector is heading. The 
findings show that banks in the euro area have 
become fewer, larger and more international. And 
this trend is likely to persist. Banks also increased 
their risk exposures in the build-up to the crisis, 
but in the future they are expected to target higher 
capital or liquidity buffers. In terms of their 
business models, banks increasingly began to rely 
more on non-deposit liabilities and non-interest 
income, which made them more dependent on 
market conditions and perceptions. This trend has 
reversed, but the near-term prospect for a revival 
of income growth is uncertain. 
The process of restructuring and the return to 
viability will take time. First, it is important to 
note that the crisis is not over yet. More losses are 
expected to emerge in the course of 2010, which 
will continue to put pressure on the banking 
system to adjust its operations. Furthermore, a 
reinforcement of the negative feedback loop from 
the real economy cannot be ruled out. Second, the 
implementation of the reform agenda has just 
taken off. Policy design will be crucial in 
determining the future of banking, but it is up to 
banks to make the appropriate changes. 
One purpose of financial market regulation is to 
preserve financial stability and avoid systemic 
risk. In this respect, regulation can foster growth 
by helping to avoid the daunting losses implied by 
systemic disruption. Yet, creating a sounder 
financial system often entails imposing a higher 
regulatory burden on market participants. If 
regulation is taken too far, there is a risk that this 
increased burden could have negative implications 
for the growth potential of the euro-area economy. 
It is important to find the appropriate balance and 
to ensure that, in the long run, improvements in 
the arrangements for financial stability translate 
into stronger and more sustainable economic 
growth. 
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1. The long-term fiscal sustainability 
challenge in the euro area (51) 
The population of the euro area is ageing, through 
both increased life expectancy and falling fertility 
rates, and this process is projected to continue 
over the next 50 years. The economic and 
budgetary consequences of this expected change 
in population structure stem mainly from a 
reduction in the working-age population and an 
increase in the number of elderly people requiring 
support. A lower number of economically active 
people leads to lower economic growth and tax 
revenues, while a higher number of retired people 
entails additional public provision of expensive 
age-related transfers and services.  
The concept of fiscal sustainability 
The concept of the sustainability of public 
finances concerns the ability of a government to 
finance its current debt and expected expenditure. 
There is no single clear-cut definition of a 
sustainable fiscal position but rather a number of 
alternative theoretical and practical approaches. In 
general, it can be stated that, at first instance, a 
sustainable position involves a debt level that does 
not entail interest payments so large that they 
cannot be paid. Thus, the sustainability of public 
finances considers the ability of a government to 
service the costs of its debt through future 
revenues. Sustainability of public finances is  
 
                                                        
(51) This focus section draws upon the detailed analysis in 
European Commission (2009), ‘Sustainability Report 2009’, 
European Economy 9/2009 and the Commission 
Communication ‘Long-term sustainability of public finances 
for a recovering economy’, COM(2009) 545 final, 
14.10.2009.   
therefore a long-term concept and differs from 
liquidity, which is concerned with the immediate 
(short-run) ability of a country to raise debt to 
finance its expenditure.  
A first way of formulating the widest definition of 
sustainability is to look at the solvency condition 
for general government through the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint. (52) This 
considers the ability of the government to meet 
the costs of its debt through future revenues. The 
intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied if the 
projected outflows of the government (current 
public debt and the discounted value of all future 
expenditure, including the projected increase in 
age-related expenditure) are covered by the 
discounted value of all future government 
revenue. This is equivalent to saying that the 
government must run sufficiently large primary 
surpluses (receipts minus spending excluding 
interest payments) going forward to cover the cost 
of servicing its debt.  
Depending on the time horizon considered – finite 
or infinite – two sustainability gap indicators can 
be derived, showing the size of the permanent 
budget adjustment required to ensure that the 
intertemporal budget constraint is met. 
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where Dt0 is gross debt as a share of GDP in the year before 
the long-term projections, PBt is the structural primary 
balance (receipts minus spending excluding interest 
payments), adjusted for cyclical movements and excluding 
one-off transactions at time t and r is the differential between 
the nominal interest rate and the nominal GDP growth rate. 
The crisis-related fiscal expansions and the ageing population raise questions about the sustainability of public 
finances in the euro area as well as in the rest of the EU. As the share of working-age people in the population 
falls and the share of the old increases, economies are faced with lower economic growth and higher costs 
associated with providing services for the ageing population. This results in pressure on public finances. 
Therefore, ensuring fiscal sustainability in the euro area requires time-consistent policies with a broad 
approach, consisting of fiscal consolidation, efforts to increase employment and enhance productivity, and 
structural reforms that prepare the euro area’s social security systems to face the future challenges. 
Fiscal measures to increase confidence and support demand are only successful if they are perceived by the 
markets and public opinion as temporary and consistent with long-term sustainability. Otherwise, if economic 
agents expect a durable widening of debt, fiscal support will lose its effectiveness and can become 
counterproductive, in particular when the crisis climax has been overcome and recovery is imminent. 
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• The S1 indicator shows the durable adjustment 
to the structural primary balance (i.e. an 
increase in taxes or cuts in expenditure) 
required to reach a target debt of 60 % of GDP 
in 2060, including paying for any additional 
expenditure from now to the target date, 
arising from an ageing population. The choice 
of the debt target for the S1 indicator is in line 
with the debt threshold in the Treaty. The 
timescale has been chosen to be long enough 
to allow the impact of ageing to be analysed in 
a meaningful way, while still remaining within 
the sights of current taxpayers and policy 
makers. The timescale also corresponds to the 
available long-term demographic and 
economic projections. 
• The S2 indicator shows the adjustment to the 
structural primary balance required to fulfil the 
infinite horizon intertemporal budget 
constraint, including paying for any additional 
expenditure arising from an ageing population. 
Table III.1 breaks the two indicators down into 
the three factors that the gap depends on, and the 
three corresponding components of the indicators. 
It shows that the initial budgetary position and the 
long-term costs of ageing affect both indicators 
directly, while the S1 indicator is also directly 
affected by the starting level of debt relative to the 
60 % target for 2060. In the results shown below, 
the contribution of the components of the 
sustainability gaps is considered in detail. 
Required adjustment given the initial 
budgetary position 
Irrespective of the increase in government 
expenditure due to projected demographic 
developments, the public finances of a given 
country may be unsustainable if the initial 
structural primary balance, the projected interest 
payments and economic growth imply an ever-
increasing debt ratio. Thus, the first component of 
the S1 and S2 indicators corresponds to the gap 
between the initial structural primary balance and 
the debt-stabilising primary surplus. This 
component is referred to as the required 
adjustment given the initial budgetary position, or 
simply IBP. (53) 
The debt requirement by 2060 
In the case of the S1 indicator, the size of the 
adjustment required directly depends on the debt 
requirement set at the end of the time period 
(60 % of GDP in 2060). For countries with 
starting government gross debt above 60 % of 
GDP, the required adjustment to reach the target 
debt by 2060 (DR) term will increase the size of 
the indicator as the effort of debt reduction by 
2060 needs to be considered. 
The required adjustment given the increase in 
age-related costs 
Finally, both S1 and S2 include a component 
which corresponds to the required adjustment due 
to the long-term changes in government 
expenditure (or simply, LTC). This component of 
both indicators is the additional adjustment 
required as a result of these expenses either to 
2060 or over an infinite horizon. The magnitude 
of the LTC component depends on both the 
demographic outlook for countries and their social 
protection arrangements. The LTC component 
represents either the change required to pay for 
the additional expenses (i.e. a durable increase in 
taxes or a cut in expenditure other than those 
related to demography) or the size of structural 
                                                        
(53) As the size of this component depends on expected growth 
and interest rates, it is not necessarily the case that the gaps to 
the debt-stabilising primary balance will have the same 
magnitude in the S1 and S2 indicators, as expected growth 
and interest rates might vary over time. However, in practice 
IBP (S1) and IBP (S2) are quite close to each other. 
Moreover, also because of the expected movements in growth 
and interest rates, including those of a cyclical nature, the 
concept of ‘debt stabilisation’ should be understood in a long-
term perspective and not year by year. 
 
Table III.1: Summarising the sustainability indicators 
 Required adjustment given the 
initial budgetary position (IBP)
Required adjustment to reach debt 
to GDP ratio of 60% in 2060 (DR)
Required adjustment due to long-
term changes in the primary 
balance (LTC)
S1= Gap to the debt-stabilising primary 
balance
+ Additional adjustment required to 
reach a debt target of 60% of GDP in 
2060
+ Additional adjustment required to 
finance the increase in public 
expenditure due to ageing up to 2060
S2= Gap to the debt-stabilising primary 
balance
+ 0 + Additional adjustment required to 
finance the increase in public 
expenditure due to ageing over an 
infinite horizon
Source: Commission services. 
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reform to social protection schemes needed to 
avoid the increase in government expenditure. 
The size of this component is likely to vary 
between the S1 and S2 indicators. The larger the 
part of the expected ageing of the population that 
is to occur in the short- rather than medium-term 
future, the larger the impact on the S1 indicator 
relative to the S2 indicator. Conversely, if the 
costs of ageing are mainly borne closer to 2060 
(and beyond) than now, the relative impact of 
ageing on the S2 indicator will be larger. 
Policy options 
The breakdown of the indicators allows an 
analysis of the driving forces behind the results 
summarised by the indicators and helps in 
identifying the required policy responses. The 
same overall sustainability gap may be the result 
of the current fiscal position (see IBP), the level 
of debt (see DR) or the expected increase in 
ageing-related expenditure (see LTC). Moreover, 
comparing LTC components in S1 and S2 (i.e. the 
finite- and infinite-horizon versions of the 
sustainability indicators) also allows the degree of 
urgency in addressing the demographic-related 
sustainability issues to be identified. 
Underlying projections of age-related 
expenditure 
An ageing population puts pressure on a country’s 
public finances primarily through its effects on the 
labour market and hence economic growth as well 
as age-related expenditure. With fewer people of 
working age, the potential growth rate of the 
economy is reduced. Changes in the estimated 
rate of economic growth affect each of the 
components of the S1 and S2 indicators. In 
addition, ageing involves increases in age-related 
expenditure, the fiscal impact of which is 
presented in the 2009 Ageing Report (see 
Table III.2). (54) As the aim is to provide an 
estimate of the long-term effect of ageing on 
sustainability, the analysis takes the figures for 
age-related costs starting in 2010. The projections 
are made on the basis of a no-policy change 
assumption where it is assumed that current tax 
and spending arrangements continue in the future. 
They are based on five expenditure categories. 
According to the projections, euro-area public 
finances would face spending increases of 5.1 pp 
of GDP on average by 2060. 
2. Main results 
This section presents the sustainability gap 
indicators and their breakdown into the IBP and 
LTC components for the euro area and its 
members. Table III.3 presents the results of the S2 
sustainability gap indicator, which have been 
calculated on the basis of the structural budgetary 
                                                        
(54) ‘2009 Ageing Report’, joint report of the European 
Commission and the EPC, European Economy 2/2009, and 
Commission Communication ‘Dealing with the Impact of an 
Ageing Population in the EU,’ COM(2009) 180 final, 
21.4.2009. 
 
Table III.2: Changes in age-related expenditure (2010-2060, percentage points of GDP) 
Pensions Health care Long-term care Unemployment Education Total
BE 4.5 1.1 1.3 -0.4 0.1 6.6
DE 2.5 1.6 1.4 -0.2 -0.2 5.1
IE 5.9 1.7 1.3 0.0 -0.2 8.7
EL 12.5 1.3 2.1 -0.1 0.2 16.0
ES 6.2 1.6 0.7 -0.4 0.2 8.3
FR 0.6 1.1 0.7 -0.3 0.0 2.2
IT -0.4 1.0 1.2 0.0 -0.2 1.6
CY 10.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.6 10.7
LU 15.3 1.1 2.0 0.0 -0.3 18.2
MT 5.1 3.1 1.6 0.0 -0.6 9.2
NL 4.0 0.9 4.6 0.0 -0.1 9.4
AT 1.0 1.4 1.2 0.0 -0.2 3.3
PT 1.5 1.8 0.1 -0.3 -0.2 2.9
SI 8.5 1.7 1.7 0.0 0.7 12.7
SK 3.6 2.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.5 5.5
FI 2.6 0.8 2.5 0.0 0.0 5.9
EA 2.7 1.3 1.3 -0.2 0.0 5.1
Source: Commission services and EPC. 
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position in 2009 and the projected change in age-
related expenditure in the period to 2060. (55) 
 
Table III.3: Results of the sustainability gap 
(S2) calculations in the baseline scenario  
(% of GDP) 
Total IBP(1) LTC(2)
BE 5.3 0.6 4.8
DE 4.2 0.9 3.3
IE 15.0 8.3 6.7
EL 14.1 2.6 11.5
ES 11.8 6.1 5.7
FR 5.6 3.8 1.8
IT 1.4 -0.1 1.5
CY 8.8 0.5 8.3
LU 12.5 -0.4 12.9
MT 7.0 1.4 5.7
NL 6.9 1.9 5.0
AT 4.7 1.6 3.1
PT 5.5 3.7 1.9
SI 12.2 3.9 8.3
SK 7.4 4.5 2.9
FI 4.0 -0.5 4.5
EA 5.8 2.3 3.5
S2
(1) IBP is the required adjustment given the initial budgetary 
position; (2) LTC is the required adjustment given the long-term 
change in the primary balance due demographic ageing. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
In the euro area as a whole, the sustainability gap 
is 5.8 % of GDP according to the S2 indicator. 
This means that to return to a sustainable path the 
euro-area countries as a whole would need to 
increase the tax burden or decrease expenditure 
now and in a durable manner by 5.8 % of GDP, or 
to adapt structural reforms that increase potential 
growth and reduce the dynamics of age-related 
expenditure. The sustainability gap is due to both 
the initial budgetary position and the long-term 
budgetary impact of ageing. The euro-area 
average, however, masks considerable variety 
between the Member States. Overall, all euro-area 
members have sustainability gaps. Nine Member 
States show a high sustainability gap of over 6 % 
of GDP, while six Member States have a 
significant sustainability gap of between 4 % and 
6 % of GDP. Only Italy — albeit one of the most 
indebted countries in the euro area — shows a 
small sustainability gap of less than 2 % of GDP 
thanks to a series of pension reforms in the last 
decades. 
The sustainability gap indicators show the size of 
the permanent adjustment that is required to keep 
public finances sustainable. Not making this 
adjustment would have the short- to medium-term 
                                                        
(55) Only the results for the more stringent S2 indicator are 
presented here as it is the main indicator used in the overall 
risk classification below.    
effect of increasing debt, before serious 
sustainability and solvency concerns start 
affecting countries’ abilities to raise debt as the 
perceived long-term risks increase. 
The initial budgetary position 
According to the IBP component of the S2 
indicator, only three euro-area Member States 
(Finland, Luxembourg and Italy) have an initial 
fiscal position which would be sustainable if long-
term costs were left aside. Seven Member States 
(Cyprus, Belgium, Germany, Malta, Austria, the 
Netherlands and Greece) require an adjustment of 
up to around 3 % of GDP to the structural public 
balance to place their public finances on a 
sustainable path, even before considering the 
long-term budgetary impact of an ageing 
population. The remaining six Member States 
(Portugal, France, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain and 
Ireland) have an initial structural fiscal position 
that would require an even greater adjustment. 
The IBPs are calculated using the budgetary 
position of 2009 as assessed in May 2009 (56) as 
the starting point. The structural primary balance 
is used in the calculation of the sustainability gap 
indicators. This removes the estimated effect of 
the economic cycle from the primary balance and 
also removes the effect of one-off measures. 
Some of the automatic effect of the economic 
crisis on budgets is therefore stripped out of the 
data. However, estimates of structural primary 
balances should be considered with caution given 
the difficulties in disentangling cyclical from 
structural effects at times of severe recessions.  
The long-term budgetary cost of ageing 
The LTC component shows significant 
differences between Member States in terms of 
the budgetary impact of ageing. It ranges from a 
required adjustment of 1.5 % of GDP in Italy to 
12.9 % in Luxembourg. 
The LTC component of the sustainability gap lies 
under 2 % of GDP for three euro-area Member 
States (Italy, France and Portugal). Five Member 
States face a budgetary impact of between 2 % 
and 5 % of GDP (Slovakia, Austria, Germany, 
Finland and Belgium). The remaining countries 
(the Netherlands, Malta, Spain, Ireland, Cyprus, 
Slovenia, Greece and Luxembourg) have an LTC 
                                                        
(56) European Economy 3/2009. Using most recent data would 
lead to changes in the indicators; these changes would, 
however, not alter the overall message the indicators convey. 
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of 5 % of GDP or above, with the costs incumbent 
on Greece and Luxembourg representing 11.5 % 
and 12.9 % of GDP, respectively.  
3. The potential impact of the current 
economic crisis and sensitivity analysis 
The assessment of the sustainability conditions in 
each of the euro-area Member States requires very 
long-term projections for demographic 
developments, interest rates, the labour market 
and the macroeconomic and fiscal situation. 
Given the relatively large margins of error 
surrounding each of those projections, it is useful 
to consider a series of sensitivity analyses, notably 
alternative growth scenarios. (57) 
Crisis related scenarios 
The baseline scenario shows a gradual reduction 
in potential growth due to population ageing. This 
scenario assumes that the loss in output in 2008–
10 is of a cyclical nature without a durable impact 
on current and projected potential. This scenario 
is basically the same as what one could have prior 
to the emergence of the crisis. Though it is 
labelled ‘baseline’ and most indicators in this 
report are based on that scenario, it appears at this 
stage an optimistic scenario. 
The ‘lost decade’ scenario shows potential growth 
taking ten years to return to its pre-crisis level; 
both labour productivity and labour input are 
assumed to reach the baseline growth rate in 2020. 
Thereafter it follows the same path as in the 
absence of the crisis, but the output lost during the 
crisis years is not recovered. 
The most pessimistic scenario is the ‘permanent 
shock’ scenario, where there is a permanent hit to 
potential growth going forward of 1 % per year 
compared to the baseline. In this case, labour 
productivity growth and labour input are assumed 
to be permanently lower due to the crisis. This 
appears to be an over-pessimistic scenario. 
The S2 indicators for the crisis-related scenarios 
are shown in Table III.4. In the lost decade 
scenario, the sustainability gap as measured by S2 
rises by 1.2 % of GDP to 7.0 % of GDP for the 
euro area. The increase is essentially driven by an 
increase in the relative long-term cost of ageing, 
as an unchanged assumption about inflation and 
                                                        
(57) The Sustainability Report presents also alternative scenarios 
relating to demographic projections, productivity growth, 
unemployment and interest rates.  . 
therefore the up-rating of pensions leads to higher 
spending as a share of (lower) GDP.  
 
Table III.4: Sustainability gaps (S2) in the 
crisis-related scenarios 
Baseline Lost decade Permanent shock
BE 5.3 7.0 8.1
DE 4.2 5.8 5.8
IE 15.0 20.6 20.4
EL 14.1 13.3 14.6
ES 11.9 14.8 15.6
FR 5.6 6.6 7.6
IT 1.4 1.8 2.6
CY 8.8 8.7 9.1
LU 12.5 13.2 12.6
MT 7.0 11.1 11.5
NL 7.0 7.5 7.8
AT 4.7 6.1 7.2
PT 5.6 6.8 7.6
SI 12.3 15.1 14.6
SK 7.4 7.4 7.4
FI 4.1 4.5 5.0
EA 5.8 7.0 7.6
Source: Commission services. 
 
In the case of the permanent shock, the effect of 
the crisis on long-term sustainability is more 
marked. Both the productivity and GDP growth 
are assumed to be on a lower trajectory, leading to 
an ever-growing difference in output levels and an 
increase in the sustainability gap of 1.8 % of GDP 
to 7.6 % of GDP. Again, this is primarily due to 
higher relative long-term costs of ageing, but the 
initial budgetary position also contributes more to 
the gap due to the lower GDP growth. 
Medium-term debt projections under 
alternative consolidation scenarios 
Rising government deficits and low growth, as 
well as financial support to the banking sector, are 
leaving a legacy of fast-growing government debt 
ratios in the euro area. Reflecting concerns arising 
from durably high deficits, this section presents 
projections of the gross debt-to-GDP ratio of the 
EU Member States for the next 20 years or so, 
under three stylised scenarios. 
These projections are based on the Commission 
services’ autumn 2009 forecasts till 2011, which 
are then extended into the future taking into 
account the ‘lost decade’ macroeconomic 
scenario. Beyond 2020, the scenarios assume a 
return of growth to the long-term trend. (58) 
                                                        
(58) These additional assumptions are also considered: the 
increase in age-related expenditure is consistent with the 
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Graph III.1 depicts the projected evolution for the 
government gross debt ratio in the euro area. The 
solid thick line shows the outcome for this 
stylised scenario under the assumption of no fiscal 
consolidation measures (Scenario 1). The gross 
debt-to-GDP ratio would rise steadily over the 
projection period. By 2015, the average debt ratio 
would be at around 100 % of GDP in the euro 
area. It would continue increasing to over 120 % 
of GDP in 2020, albeit with large differences 
across countries. The highest increases in the debt 
ratio would take place in Ireland. Cyprus, 
Luxembourg and Finland would be the only euro-
area Member States with debt ratios below 60 % 
of GDP in 2020. 
The graph also shows the results of two further 
scenarios. In Scenario 2, from 2012 on, all euro-
area Member States would implement fiscal 
consolidation efforts (measured in terms of 
structural primary balance) of 0.5 % of GDP per 
year until they reach their medium-term 
objectives (MTOs). (59) The graph clearly 
illustrates that this consolidation rhythm — which 
is the benchmark consolidation effort in the SGP 
— would not be enough to stabilise, let alone 
reduce, the debt ratio by 2030. 
A consolidation effort of 1 % of GDP per year 
(Scenario 3) until the MTOs of each Member 
State are reached would stabilise the government 
debt ratio in the euro area in 2016. The debt ratio 
would, however, still be larger than in the pre-
crisis years, and significantly above the 
Maastricht reference value.  
Although these scenarios are based on a number 
of simplifying assumptions, they show that fast 
debt reduction requires serious consolidation 
efforts. Structural measures that contribute to 
avoiding a ‘lost decade’ of slow GDP growth 
would also decisively contribute to early 
stabilisation, and then fast reduction, of the 
government debt ratio. 
                                                                                  
macroeconomic scenario; the tax-to-GDP ratios are projected 
to converge to their pre-2007 level for countries with 2010 
tax burdens below their 2007 level. For countries with 2010 
tax-to-GDP ratio above the pre-crisis level, it is assumed that 
the tax ratio remains constant; the implicit interest rate on 
government debt converges to 3 % in real terms in 2020 and 
remains constant thereafter, for all countries; specific 
stimulus measures projected for 2011 are withdrawn in 2012; 
there is zero stock-flow adjustment. 
(59) The medium-term objectives (MTOs) used here are those that 
were in place at the time of the 2008/09 round of stability and 
convergence programmes.   
Graph III.1: Medium-term debt projections 
under alternative assumptions, euro area  
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Source: Commission services. 
Scenario on postponing retirement 
This section presents a scenario where effective 
retirement ages in all euro-area Member States are 
increased in a uniform manner. The aim is to 
illustrate the impact of reforms aimed at 
increasing the retirement age on the sustainability 
of public finances. Ages of labour-market exit 
vary, however, significantly between countries, 
which are thus in differing positions to address 
their sustainability challenges through reforms 
that would defer retirement. 
In the absence of policy measures aimed at 
postponing effective retirement ages there will be 
a very slow increase in the exit ages (see Graph 
III.2, baseline). This increase is related to the fact 
that different age cohorts have different 
participation rates. It should be noted that, 
according to the demographic projections, 
remaining life expectancy at 62 is expected to 
increase by 6 years.  
The postponed retirement scenario is based on the 
assumption that exit ages for each Member State 
increase by two years — on top of the baseline — 
from 2010 to 2020 in a linear fashion. After 2020, 
the exit ages keep rising by two thirds of the 
increase in remaining life expectancy. Graph III.2 
shows the trajectories of average exit ages in the 
baseline scenario and the postponed retirement 
scenario for the euro area as a whole. The 
projected evolution in remaining life expectancy 
at 62 is also shown. As the graph shows, the 
scenario is such that the length of retirement 
remains broadly constant from 2008 until 2060. 
The main implications of the increase in exit ages 
are related to the increase in labour supply and the 
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cut in overall pension expenditure as compared 
with the baseline. Given the increase in labour 
supply, GDP growth rises on average 0.14 % per 
year: by 2060 the GDP level is around 7½% 
larger than in the baseline. The ratio to GDP of 
pension expenditure in the euro area as a whole 
falls by 1.8 pp of GDP; the average pension 
increases in line with GDP, but the number of 
pensions paid is lower than in the baseline. 
The postponed retirement scenario yields a 
sustainability gap (S2) of 4.2 % of GDP for the 
euro area as a whole, which is 1.6 pp lower than 
in the baseline scenario. Therefore, a substantial 
gap would remain. 
The intuition behind these results is as follows: 
postponing exit ages, as described, practically 
eliminates the increase in pension expenditure as a 
share of GDP, although there is an increase in the 
average pension. The projected increase in 
pension expenditure in the baseline scenario is, 
however, only half of the overall long-term 
increase in age-related expenditure (healthcare 
spending and long-term care remain unchanged). 
Moreover, for the euro area, the LTC (the 
required adjustment given the long-term change in 
expenditure) is around half of the sustainability 
gap (S2) identified in the baseline scenario. 
Therefore, the reduction in the sustainability 
imbalance is only around one fourth of S2 in the 
baseline scenario. 
Graph III.2: Exit ages in the euro area  
(baseline and postponed retirement scenario) 
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4. Other factors relevant for assessing 
fiscal sustainability 
This section expands on the discussion of 
uncertainty by looking at a range of factors that 
cannot be reflected or are not sufficiently reflected  
 
in the sustainability indicators (S2), but are 
nonetheless important in assessing the overall 
sustainability of a country’s public finances.  
Level of debt 
The level of government debt enters the 
sustainability indicators directly and affects 
sustainability through the need to service the debt. 
However, beyond this direct effect, the level of 
debt can have further consequences on both the 
real and the political side of the economy. A high 
level of debt can reduce a country’s ability to deal 
with even a temporary shock to its interest rate or 
growth rate. With the costs of servicing the debt 
being more significant the higher the level of debt, 
a shock to the cost of servicing has the potential to 
be markedly more significant than for countries 
with a lower stock of debt to re-finance. 
Moreover, a high level of debt can also affect the 
interest rate paid on it, with threshold effects 
being a possibility. These occur when debt 
reaches a certain level beyond which interest rates 
are pushed up. The high levels of debt in some of 
the euro-area Member States are therefore 
considered as an additional risk factor over and 
above their contribution to the sustainability gaps 
(See Box III.1).  
Pension expenditure projections and social and 
political risks 
There is a possibility that the assumptions about 
pension expenditure underlying the Member 
States’ pension expenditure projections may be 
difficult to implement socially and politically. 
While pension reform is important for many 
countries, it is also important that the expected 
levels of average pension are realistic. Countries 
forecasting a strong fall in the relative generosity 
of their pensions in relation to the average wage 
may find that they are unable to deliver this for 
social reasons. Such countries may consequently 
face a higher sustainability challenge than is 
apparent by looking just at the indicators, 
although the extent to which this occurs will 
depend on private pension provision and whether 
individuals anticipate the decline in the state 
pension and make alternative arrangements for 
their retirement. Moreover, private pensions 
themselves are not without risk. Insofar as they 
depend on the vagaries of financial markets, a 
shortfall in their performance can result in 
pressure on the government to step in. 
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Box III.1: The effect of debt on interest rates
Interest paid on government debt is determined by a number of factors. The main ones are the perceived credit risk 
of this debt, the liquidity restrictions in place in the country issuing the debt, the level of risk aversion of investors 
and the microstructure of the bond market. The level of debt in place may also be affected by these determinants as 
the cost of debt will be a factor in a government’s willingness to issue bonds and therefore borrow money, adding to 
the stock of debt. For example, a Member State with low liquidity restrictions may find it easier to sell debt at a 
lower interest rate. This will make it more likely to have higher levels of debt as it is able to finance its deficits at 
lower cost. However, the liquidity of the market might in itself be a function of the level of debt – a country that 
traditionally has significant government debt might have well  developed credit markets making the buying and 
selling of its bonds commonplace and therefore easy. This illustrates the fact that the relationship between the level 
of debt and the interest rate faced by governments is not a simple one. (1) 
Empirical evidence suggests that perceived credit risk plays an important role in determining the interest a 
government must pay on its debt. In particular, while a deteriorating domestic outlook for fiscal deficits and debt are 
associated with higher interest rates, there is also evidence of the importance of the interaction of higher deficits and 
debt. This is particularly the case for Member States with levels of debt close to or above 100 % of GDP, which 
appear more likely to experience increases in their interest rates if debt increases further.  
Countries with high levels of debt face the possibility of an ever-increasing debt burden due to either higher interest 
rates or low GDP growth rates or both. For example, even a small increase in interest rates can have effects on the 
budgetary balance that can lead to ever-spiralling debt if a government does not act quickly to contain the extra 
borrowing through other measures. This is called the snowball effect. Data from early on in the financial and 
economic crisis show that despite a period of lower interest payments in recent years, the snowball effect has 
increased dramatically since 2007, from around or below 1 % of GDP to 5 % in 2009. The first graph shows that the 
foreseen deterioration in public finances and subdued low growth rate may play an increasingly important role to 
explain the possible future evolution of government bond interest rates. 
Interest payment on public debt & snowball effect in the 
euro area (1) 
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t-1, i represents the average interest payment on debt and y is 
the nominal GDP growth rate. 
Source: Commission services. 
Source: Commission services. 
Moreover, econometric analysis of the size and change of government borrowing adds weight to the importance of 
the interaction of debt and deficits in determining government bond yields (the interest rate paid by governments on 
the bonds they issue to enable them to borrow). In particular, the impact of deteriorated fiscal balances on 
government bond yields appears significantly higher for high debt countries than for countries with average debt 
levels.  
                                                           
(1) This box draws heavily on Barrios, Iversen, Lewandowska and Setzer (2009), ‘Determinants of intra-euro area government 
bond spreads during the financial crisis’ European Economy, Economic Papers 388, November 2009.  
(Continued on the next page)
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Contingent liabilities are those which the 
government only needs to assume if particular 
situations arise. These may be implicit — such as 
dealing with natural disasters — or explicit, such 
as loan guarantees. In the light of the economic 
and financial crisis, many Member States have 
taken on explicit contingent liabilities to aid the 
functioning of the financial sector and other 
industries. Depending on whether or not these are 
called in, the public finances of the Member 
States may find themselves with additional 
spending that is currently not being budgeted for. 
Tax ratio 
Another factor that is considered is the apparent 
scope which Member States’ governments have to 
address the sustainability problems. In theory, a 
sustainability gap can be filled by increasing tax 
revenues or reducing spending. Reducing 
spending means either reducing spending on non-
age-related expenditure or reforming the social 
security system so that the costs of ageing can be 
contained. For countries with current very high 
levels of tax, the options may be more limited as it 
may be difficult and economically costly for them 
to increase tax further. 
5. Overall assessment of the risks to long-
term sustainability of public finances 
The quantitative sustainability indicators, the 
sensitivity analysis and the analysis of additional 
factors allow an overall assessment to be made of 
the long-term risks to public finance sustainability 
faced by euro-area Member States. 
In order to indicate the relative importance of the 
risks, a three-level categorisation has been used 
for several years in a number of Council 
documents (e.g. the Council opinion and 
respective Commission recommendations 
concerning Member States’ stability 
programmes). While this categorisation gives a 
clear indication of the relative degree of long-term 
risk different countries are facing, the overall 
assessment also provides an indication of where 
the long-term risks stem from. 
In the euro area, Finland is the only country that is 
rated as a low long-term risk country. In spite of a 
recent widening of government deficits and an 
increase in government debt, Finland still enjoys a 
relatively strong initial budgetary position. 
Although Finland has an above-average projected 
increase in age-related expenditure over the long 
term, the large stock of public financial assets 
provides a buffer against the negative budgetary 
impacts of the crisis.  
The intermediate group of countries (Belgium, 
Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria and 
Portugal) consists of Member States with very 
different characteristics, but three distinct 
categories can be distinguished. Belgium, 
Germany and Austria are countries with a 
significant cost of ageing but which currently 
have relatively strong structural budgetary 
positions (assuming that the negative implications 
of the crisis do not become entrenched). For these 
countries, reforms to address the rising cost of 
ageing are a priority and these can be undertaken 
without waiting for the end of the financial crisis, 
insofar as the reforms do not adversely affect the 
recovery. This is also the case for Luxembourg, 
which faces the highest increase in age-related 
expenditure of all euro-area countries, but which 
is included in the medium long-term risk category 
due to its low level of debt and high stock of 
assets. For Belgium, the strong budgetary position 
in recent years is counterweighted by very high 
levels of debt-to-GDP ratio. Nevertheless, 
Belgium is assessed as presenting medium long-
term risk because of its track record of running 
consistently high primary surpluses over time and 
reducing its debt when the economy is not in  
crisis.  
France and Portugal are countries that need to 
consolidate, though to different degrees, their 
public finances over the medium term but for 
which the costs of ageing are relatively less of a 
Box (continued) 
The second graph plots the estimated linear relationship between spreads and deficit for a given level of initial debt 
while controlling for a number of other determinants of interest rate spreads vs. Germany (such as liquidity 
conditions, and global risk aversion). It shows that the impact of higher deficit (i.e. for negative values of the deficit 
forecast variables) on the yield spread tends to increase rather significantly with a higher initial level of debt. 
Combined with the snowball effect, it points to significant risks of further rises in interest payment being associated 
with higher debt levels, in the event of adverse shocks in financial markets. 
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concern, usually as a result of reforms made to 
their pension systems. For Italy neither the 
budgetary position nor the long-term cost of 
ageing are particularly high. However, the initial 
levels of debt give cause for concern. In Italy, 
rapid budgetary consolidation is required to 
ensure a steady reduction of the currently very 
high level of debt, although it will need to be 
undertaken at a time when it does not adversely 
affect the recovery from the economic and 
financial crisis.  
The third category of countries (Ireland, Greece, 
Spain, Cyprus, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovenia 
and Slovakia) are characterised by a very 
significant rise in age-related expenditure over the 
long term, and measures aimed at curbing them 
will be necessary. For Greece and Slovenia (as 
well as Luxembourg) the increase in these 
expenditures is over 10 pp of GDP. For most of 
the Member States in this high long-term risk 
category it will be necessary to address both the 
long-term costs of ageing through reforms to 
pension systems and the weakness of the 
budgetary positions. Reforms to the pension and 
healthcare system which will not adversely affect 
the recovery of the Member States’ economies 
should be approached with urgency.  
6. Policy implications and conclusion 
The crisis-related deterioration in public finances 
and the projected increase in expenditure due to 
demographic change both constitute major policy 
challenges. Given the current budgetary situation, 
the projected changes in population structure and 
the long-term scenarios for economic growth, the 
government debts of many countries in the euro 
area will experience significant increases. 
Although interest rates are currently low, soaring 
government bond issuance will put upward 
pressure on rates as the economies emerge from 
crisis and crowd out investment.  
Public finances, including social protection 
systems, have cushioned the economic and social 
  
 
  
impact of the crisis. Successful fiscal expansion to 
counter recession and ensuring longer-term fiscal 
sustainability are not incompatible. Fiscal 
measures to increase confidence and support 
demand are only successful if they are perceived 
by the markets and public opinion as temporary 
and consistent with long-term sustainability. 
The strategy to prepare for the economic 
implications of demographic changes has been in 
place since the Stockholm European Council in 
2001. This strategy includes (i) deficit and debt 
reduction; (ii) increases in employment rates; and 
(iii) reforms of social protection systems. It has 
shown its validity and remains applicable. Yet, the 
macroeconomic situation created by the crisis has 
changed the context, the way such a strategy may 
be applied, the relative weight of its components 
and the urgency of its implementation. Whereas, 
prior to the crisis, the three prongs of the strategy 
were options from which countries could choose, 
each of these pillars is now indispensable for most 
EU countries. 
Increases in the effective retirement age that 
reflect gains in longevity are being contemplated 
in several Member States and merit wider 
consideration. On top of savings to government 
expenditure in a medium- to long-term horizon, 
an increase in effective retirement ages 
contributes to increasing the working population 
and stemming the deceleration in potential output. 
Moreover, the extension in working life and the 
respective accumulation of pension rights will 
have a favourable impact on pensioners’ income. 
In the EMU, the issue of safeguarding long-term 
fiscal sustainability is at the core of the fiscal 
framework. It is in this context and to support the 
nascent recovery that the Commission has 
recommended the correction of imbalances in 
those countries that are currently in a situation of 
excessive deficit. It is also in this perspective that 
euro-area Member States are expected to give 
specific attention to sustainability-oriented 
strategies in their stability programmes. 
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